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1. Introduction  
In 1995, after the completion of the trade negotiation in the Uruguay Round, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO was a continuance of the political trade cooperation 
begun under GATT in 1947, and with its establishment, the WTO brought about 
several institutional changes compared to its predecessor GATT. Under the GATT 
there had been no regular organization, but with the WTO came a firm global trade 
organization. New subjects, such as services and intellectual property, were being 
incorporated into the multilateral trading system for the first time. One of the changes 
that got a lot of attention was the creation of a new dispute settlement system (DSS), 
designed to solve disputes between the member countries. Compared to GATT, The 
WTO now had a stronger and more automatic DSS, often referred to as the “jewel in 
its crown.” The system is unique in international law and institutions, both at present 
and historically (Jackson 2006: 135).  Dispute settlement is by many viewed as the 
most significant activity of the WTO, and the WTO DSS is commonly viewed as 
legalized.    
1.1 Research question  
The topic of this thesis is the effect of the 1995 changes in the dispute settlement 
procedures on member states‟ compliance. My research question is as follows: 
Compared to the GATT Dispute Settlement System, have the more legalized Dispute 
Settlement System of the WTO increased compliance with the rules and rulings of the 
international trade regime?  
This question is of academic relevance and current interest. The current financial 
situation of the world has shown an increase in the willingness by the governments of 
the world to use protectionism, the very opposite of the intention behind creating the 
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WTO. Also, the possibility of cooperation between countries is a topic long studied in 
political science.  
1.2 Literature review  
The topic of compliance has been a central issue in the field of political science since 
the 1960s, and especially in the subfields International Relations and International 
Law. The changes to a more legal and institutional framework in the WTO brought 
about great academic interest, both on the general level which concerns state 
sovereignty and the possibility for international cooperation, and on the more specific 
level, which concerns the history of GATT and the international trade cooperation 
seen since the end of World War Two. The more general theoretic debate will be 
covered later in the chapter 3 of this thesis.  
On the specific level, Robert Hudec and John H. Jackson are leading figures. Hudec 
started writing about international trade law in the 1960, when it was still an “infant 
field” (Trachtman 2003: 311). The two scholars study the effect of the rules and their 
consequences in both GATT and WTO. The two do however differ on the impact of 
legalization on compliance. Jackson saw the GATT DSS as containing “a number of 
problems” (Jackson 2006: 143), and “insists that the steady shift to more formal rules 
and processes in GATT (…) culminating with the WTO (…) enhanced compliance 
with those decisions and hence the effectiveness of not only the dispute resolution but 
the trade regime as a whole” (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 542) Hudec does work 
that focuses on the politics of dispute settlement and emphasized the success, political 
flexibility and apparent sustainability of the GATT model and cautioned that the 
legalized approach might be too cumbersome in various political contexts (Steinberg 
2004: 247). He does agree with Jackson that legalization altered compliance, but 
challenges the view that further legalization will have any impact (Raustiala and 
Slaughter 2002: 542). He also “maintained that the GATT dispute settlement system 
was „quasi-judicial‟ in nature, not entirely diplomatic” (Steger 2002: 482). 
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The creation of the WTO have produced studies on free trade, the formation of 
preferential trade agreements and on the impact the organization has on developing 
countries (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003; Rose 2004, Bhaqwati 2001). The key 
question of why, when and how the WTO - and the GATT before it - produces 
compliance with rulings have been taken up by many scholar interested in compliance 
and the role of law in international relations (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 542). 
Irwin (2002) calls the WTO DSS “strength of the world trading system”, but also 
cautions us that even if a country loses a case, the WTO cannot force a change in that 
country‟s law, as a domestic court can: 
WTO panels merely determine whether disputed policies conflict with WTO rules 
and, if they do, recommend that members bring those policies into conformity. The 
disputing countries must still resolve the matter themselves, often through a 
negotiated settlement (ibid: 190). 
Hughes (2006) views the entire WTO DSS process as “remarkably efficient”(ibid: 
195), and when looking at the implementation phase in WTO, claims that the critique 
of this phase as “slow or ineffective” is unjustified (ibid: 229). She claims that the 
“compliance record (…) has been extremely high; there are a few famous cases of 
very slow compliance or non-compliance, which have left the impression that the 
problem is more widespread than it is in reality” (ibid.).  
Palmeter and Alexandrov (2002) study the imposing of restrictions on the trade of 
another WTO member as a “tool” for imposing compliance (ibid: 646). When looking 
at a dispute between Canada and Brazil, they find that countermeasures are not 
appropriate for inducing compliance, and they view countermeasures as a setback for 
the entire free trade system, and warn against increasing the sanctions available in 
WTO (ibid: 658-66).  
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has received a lot of attention. According to van den 
Bossche (2006) when the AB was created, it was expected not to play a prominent 
role in the WTO DSS, but ended up achieving “great prominence” and is now, “in all 
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but name, „the World Trade Court‟” (ibid: 300).  This is, among other things, because 
of its working procedures, which have allowed it to “conduct its work in a fair, 
efficient, and genuinely judicial manner” (ibid: 306), and because of its consistent 
behavior towards rule interpretation and its balancing of free trade and other societal 
values and interests (ibid: 320). Marceau (2006) says the AB has ensured coherence 
in the WTO (ibid: 347). Steger (2002) claims the AB has contributed to establishing a 
DSS which is solidly rooted in due process and procedural fairness, which makes the 
DSS a system which is administered fairly, impartially and in accordance with the 
rights and obligations of WTO members (ibid: 495). Both Hudec and Jackson share 
the view that the AB has had a positive effect on compliance (ibid: 493).   
Horlick (2002) looks at the effect on compliance and finds problems with the 
compliance structure of the WTO resolution process. According to him, there is a lack 
of incentives to swift compliance, because of the possibility of modifying the Panel 
Report through the AB and the wording “compliance within reasonable period of 
time” in Article 21.3 in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, extends the period of 
cost-free non-compliance (ibid: 637-39). The countries are therefore faced with an 
“irresistibly temptation” to delay compliance (ibid.). Sacerdoti (2006) claims that 
“implementation has often been complex and has extended over time” (ibid: 54). The 
cause identified by him, is the degree of domestic action required to implement; 
implementation is swift when domestic action required is small, slow when legislative 
branches has to be involved (ibid). 
Busch and Reinhardt (2002) studies in a quantitative study if the legalization of the 
WTO DSS contributed to an increased likelihood of initiated disputes among 
developed states in the WTO, compared to GATT. They find that the improvements 
made in 1989 in the GATT, increased the likelihood of initiation, but that the WTO 
did not, at least until the end of 1998. They therefore conclude, as Hudec did in 1999, 
that “writers have tended to overstate the difference between the new procedure and 
its GATT predecessor” (ibid: 464).  They also study the effect of the WTO on least 
developed countries, and find that the result for these countries is “rather 
 5 
disappointing”, since the countries are now one-third less likely to file a complaint 
under the WTO than they were under the post 1989 GATT regime (ibid: 467). One 
reason for this is several new stages of legal activity brought about by the legalization 
(ibid.).  
In 2008, International Studies Quarterly published two articles which studied if the 
changes made from GATT to WTO had changed the behavior of the member states. 
Kim (2008) looks at the effect that increased procedural cost in the WTO, due to new 
and complex procedural rules, has on countries‟ decisions to initiate dispute 
settlement. He performs a quantitative study where he compares dispute initiation 
under the GATT and the WTO, and finds that in the WTO, compared to the GATT, 
“the probability of member countries requesting consultations - which triggers the 
formal dispute settlement procedure - is much higher for countries with higher 
capacity (developed countries) than for countries with lower capacity (developing 
countries)” (ibid: 679).  
Then, in a qualitative small N-study, Zangl (2008) investigates if the United States 
and the EU have changed their behavior due to the legalization of international trade 
rules in the WTO. Zangl‟s study looks at the diverging views held by realism and 
neoliberal institutionalism on the effect of international organizations and their 
structure, and investigates the GATT/WTO DSS in this light. In four cases involving 
the United States and The EU both as complainant and respondent, he finds that the 
legalization in the WTO made both parties more compliant (ibid: 846).  
My study places itself close to Zangl‟s study. I will perform a qualitative small N-
study were I use Zangl‟s method on a new set of cases to test the robustness of his 
conclusions. According to Kim (2008) the main deficiency in the literature on 
GATT/WTO DSS is that “analysis of the consequences of legalization in international 
institutions is theoretically indeterminate and empirically absent” (ibid: 659). 
Generally speaking, one can say that there is a consensus that the WTO made the 
international trade regime more “legalized”. But the effects of such legalization have 
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not been widely studied empirically. My study will add to the relatively small set of 
empirical studies in this field.  
1.3 Research design  
This thesis is a study of a few selected countries‟ behavior under different 
international trade regimes. I am going to study if the new DSS in the WTO has had 
any effect on the compliance of the member countries. The method I use is case study 
research, which can be defined “as an intensive study of a single unit or a small 
number of units (the cases)” (Gerring 2007:37). The cases I have chosen are the 
following: 
1) The “Japan-Alcohol”-dispute. The matter of the dispute is alcohol-taxes in 
Japan, which was disputed under both the GATT and the WTO. The 
respondent is Japan and the complainants are Britain, United States and 
Canada  
2) The “US-Softwood lumber”-dispute. The matter of the dispute is duties on 
imported lumber from Canada, which was disputed under both the GATT and 
the WTO. The respondent is the United States and the complainant is Canada 
3) The “EC-Sugar”-dispute. The matter of the dispute is the European 
Communities‟ export subsidies on sugar, which was disputed under both the 
GATT and the WTO. The respondent is the EC and the complainants are 
Australia and Brazil and Thailand 
The key question is now why these cases and what these cases can say about 
compliance in GATT/WTO?  
When studying dispute settlement under GATT and WTO, you have several hundred 
potential cases that can be used for research. All the disputed cases under 
GATT/WTO are available on the WTO homepage, WTO.org. Which technique for 
choosing cases should then be applied? My thesis builds largely upon Zangl‟s article 
and the goal of my thesis is to test his findings further. Zangl‟s article is a study of the 
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effect of basic systemic characteristics. Andersen (1997) says that when studying 
basic systemic characteristics, you find cases where the actors are faced with identical 
problems, the same actors are involved, the actors are organized in the same way and 
the significance of the problem as viewed by society is the same (ibid: 121). Zangl 
uses the method of most similar systems design where he keeps the matter of the 
dispute and the disputing countries constant, thereby controlling for confounding 
factors (Zangl 2008: 832). His study is also theory testing, as my study will be. Van 
Evera (1997) says that one case selection criterion that is good for testing theories is 
to find cases that are good for replicating previous tests. This replication can be exact 
or inexact, which is more common (“quasi-replication”) (ibid: 87). The three dispute 
pairs I have chosen are well suited for replicating the test made by Zangl, since the 
dispute matter is constant. Zangl did however have the same countries involved in all 
cases, whereas my test will have different countries involved in the different cases. I 
will discuss the advantages of this in the three case chapters.  
There are however several also methodological weaknesses of my approach that one 
should be aware of.  
The first is that this way of selecting cases, gives you the dilemma that if you are to 
find two similar cases, you have to focus on unsolved or unfinished cases under 
GATT. The aspect of time is therefore relevant. According to Pruitt (1991), 
negotiators face a choice among three strategies for moving toward agreement: 
contending, problem solving, and yielding (ibid: 78). In contending, negotiators 
pursue their goals by trying to persuade the other party to concede. In problem 
solving, the goal is to locate an option that is satisfactory for both parties. Yielding 
involves diminishing one‟s goals (ibid.). The interplay of the three strategies is 
described as follows: 
Contending and yielding often alternate in the early stages of negotiation. What 
presumably happens is that negotiators become discouraged after a period of 
contending because the other party has not capitulated, and so they lower their goals 
(namely, yield) to a more realistic level. This allows them to return, with new hope, to 
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a period of contending. Indirect causation may also help explain why problem 
solving often emerges toward the end of negotiation. After a period of alternating 
between contending and yielding, negotiators begin to sense that each party has 
conceded as far as it can; hence neither yielding nor contending will work any 
longer. Problem solving remains as the only viable approach (Pruitt 1991: 81).  
Thus, after a certain time, the problem solving, or collaboration behavior will appear. 
A case that started under GATT and went for years, and continued under the WTO, 
could therefore reach a solution under the WTO simply because of the time aspect. 
That a country is compliant under WTO is therefore not a certain sign that the WTO is 
creating that compliance.  
A case study is well suited for controlling for this effect, thus providing strong 
internal validity, because it allows the researcher to peek into the box of causality to 
locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural causality and its 
purported effect. The investigation of a single case also allows one to test the causal 
implications of a theory, thus providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument 
(Gerring 2007:45).   
Second, this way of selecting cases does not make the researcher look at cases that 
were solved under the GATT. The cases that I will investigate will either be cases that 
were not solved or partially solved (negotiated settlement) under GATT. This can 
result in a tendency for this thesis to underestimate mechanisms for dispute settlement 
under the GATT. According to Jackson (2006) the GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism was “quite successful” and “worked better than expected and arguably 
better than those of most international dispute procedures” (ibid: 137). So the GATT 
clearly worked. This thesis will however look at those cases that were not solved 
under GATT and went on to the WTO to see if legalization of the DSS could 
contribute to a solution.  
A third problem is that when studying GATT/WTO, there is a selection bias, due to 
the fact that many cases are never filed at the GATT/WTO. Litigation can be costly; 
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the potential complainant may not want to draw attention to the dubious legality of 
policies it, too, employs (Reinhardt & Busch 2002: 460) When it comes to imposing 
disputable trade measures, potential defendant countries may choose these selectively, 
dependent on the probability of the target of those measures filing a complaint (Kim 
2008: 666). This problem is mostly relevant for quantitative studies and for studies of 
the WTO‟s effect on global free trade. In this thesis, this point is important because it 
narrows down the validity field. This thesis will not have strong external validity, 
because I will not analyze the complete trade policies of the countries involved, and 
the small number of cases I have chosen will not have strong validity when it comes 
to the general phenomenon of compliance in the WTO. This study is therefore a 
typical example of the trade off between causation a researcher intends to achieve. A 
cross-case large-N study would have given an estimate of the causal effect of the 
WTO DSS across a population of cases, but would have been less strong when it 
comes to illuminating causal mechanisms. This is where my study will have its 
advantage; using a method suited for finding the causal mechanisms leading to a 
country‟s action when involved in WTO litigation.   
There is also a methodological problem of measuring compliance. Compliance is in 
this thesis is to be understood “as a state of conformity or identity between an actor‟s 
behavior and a specified rule” (Raustiala & Slaughter 2002: 539). The question of 
why, when and how the WTO produces a country‟s possible compliance with a ruling 
is central to the analytical element of this thesis. A small-N study is well suited for 
finding the causal mechanisms for compliance. When studying decisional behavior, 
case study research may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, 
and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting 
(Gerring 2007: 45). Compliance is also closely related to implementation. 
Implementation, the process of putting international commitments into practice, is 
typically a critical step towards compliance. Compliance can occur without 
implementation, for example if an international commitment matches current policy 
practice (Raustiala & Slaughter 2002: 539). In this thesis, I will therefore look closely 
at the actors‟ implementation policy as a measurement of compliance. Since 
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compliance can come from a multitude of causes, a small-N case study allows the 
researcher to isolate the effect of potential control variables. There are several 
theories about why a country might choose to comply with the ruling of an 
international organization independent of the institutional design, and these will be 
covered in chapter 3.  
1.4 Disposition 
Chapter 1 is an introduction.  
Chapter 2 gives an account of the dispute settlement system in the GATT and the 
changes made in this system with the creation of the WTO. 
Chapter 3 provides an account of the views held by realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism on the effect of legalized dispute settlement systems. 
Chapter 4 describes and analyzes the proceedings and results in the “Japan-Alcohol”-
case.  
Chapter 5 describes and analyzes the proceedings and results in the “US-Softwood 
lumber”-case. 
Chapter 6 describes and analyzes the proceedings and results in the “EC-Sugar”-case. 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings in the three case chapters in light of the theory 
presented in chapter 3.  
Chapter 8 concludes. 
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2. The changes made from GATT to WTO 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947. 
GATT was created to facilitate bargaining among participants over the regulation and 
liberalization of trade policy (Barton et al 2006: 68). 48 years later, the World Trade 
Organization was established. This establishment brought about several institutional 
changes compared to its predecessor GATT (Hovi 1996: 331). The GATT regime had 
in reality no unitary dispute settlement system. The caption “dispute settlement” is not 
used in the General Agreement from 1947 and no institutions was established for this 
purpose. Such institutions have instead, based on pragmatic needs and practical 
experience, gradually emerged (Hovi 1996: 332). Dispute settlement procedures assist 
in making rules effective, adding an essential measure of predictability and 
effectiveness to the operation of a rule-oriented system (Croley & Jackson 1996: 193).  
The actual dispute procedures in the GATT were based on article XXIII, which 
specified procedures in cases when parties could not agree after consultation. The 
article references a contracting party‟s right to go to the GATT Contracting Parties for 
a ruling on a violation. The practice of establishing a panel to assist the Contracting 
Parties in understanding a case was initially specified not in the articles but in the 
Annex that describes the customary practice of the GATT. Over time that Annex 
became more detailed, covering issues such as notification, rules for the selection of 
panel members, and the role of member governments. By the 1980s, dispute 
settlement procedures had been formalized in a series of understandings among the 
Contracting Parties, which specified in great detail the structure, timing, and rules for 
the resolution of disputes (Barton et al 2006: 68). The fundamental nature of dispute 
settlement in the GATT was as follows: A case was first vetted in consultations in 
which the only requirement is that a defendant gives “sympathetic consideration” to 
the complainant‟s grievances (Busch 2000: 428). If, within a set timetable, the case 
was not resolved to its satisfaction, the complainant could request the formation of a 
panel, an ad hoc tribunal that interprets the rights and obligations at stake and issues a 
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ruling. The Contracting Parties had to agree by consensus to establish a panel, to 
adopt the report of a panel, and to authorize any retaliation if a contracting party 
maintained rules inconsistent with a panel report. Of course, respondents sometimes 
blocked the consensus required to move through each stage of the process (Barton el 
al 2006:68, Busch 2000:428). In 1989, the reform Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Improvements (DSPI) was ushered. This reform meant that a defendant could no 
longer threaten to delay or block the formation of a panel (Busch 2000: 426). In other 
words, the GATT panels prior to 1989 existed on the mercy of the defendant. Prior to 
the DSPI, due to the ability of a defendant to block the formation of a panel, observers 
compared GATT to a court that could not deliberate or rule without the permission of 
the accused (Busch 2000:428). As one observer said, “The GATT has been likened to 
a court with no bailiff. Once a guilty party stands condemned, there is no bailiff to 
enforce the sentence. Moreover, the guilty party can avoid sentencing simply by 
rejecting the verdict” (Reinhardt 2001: 176). In a study, Busch (2000) finds that the 
IDSP had “no discernable effect on the process of dispute settlement” (ibid: 435).   
The fact that panel reports, to become legally binding, had to be adopted in the GATT 
Council by consensus was viewed as the most important shortcoming of the system. A 
contracting party that was found to have acted inconsistently with its GATT 
obligations could thus block the adoption of the unfavourable panel report and 
thereby frustrate the operation of the dispute settlement system (Van Den Bossche 
2006: 291). The GATT Contracting Parties therefore resolved at the launching 
meeting of the Uruguay Round in 1986 to deal with some of the defects and problems 
of existing dispute rules (Croley & Jackson 1996: 193).  
2.1 The new WTO system 
The result of this resolve came about in 1995 when the WTO dispute settlement 
system was established. As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was built 
upon the dispute settlement practices developed under GATT since the late 1940s and 
was therefore not devised from scratch in the Uruguay Round (Sacerdoti et al 2006: 
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1). However, the WTO agreement brought about such changes to the GATT system 
that they induced scholars to use such phrases as “dramatic” (Bello 1996) and “a 
major turning point” (Panitchpakdi 2006). And where the GATT was an agreement, 
the WTO now was an organisation (Claes et al 2006:129). Sacerdoti (2006) calls the 
new WTO dispute settlement system  
The mirror of the qualitative leap taken between the GATT and the WTO: away from 
the partial, incomplete framework, multilateral yet not organized, essentially ‗power 
based‘, and relying only on negotiations, towards a ‗rules-based‘ organisation. In the 
new system, procedural guarantees and an implementation mechanism in order to 
ensure compliance with the rules represent a necessary complement to the agreed 
substantive provisions‖ (ibid: 36). 
Upon the creation of the WTO, the U.S. government favoured automatic and binding 
dispute settlement because most thought such a judicial process would help enforce 
the set of substantive rules legislated in the Uruguay Round - which the United States 
favoured (Barton et al 2006: 67). Japan and the EU also favoured the legalization, 
believing it would benefit, since all three parties viewed themselves more often in 
compliance with trading rules than its trading partners (ibid:210). The procedures for 
dispute settlement in the WTO, which are found in annex 2 to the WTO agreement, 
consists of 27 articles which lay out a detailed description of the procedures and time 
limits for each step in the dispute settlement. The role of the Dispute Settlement Body 
is described with these words:    
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is hereby established to administer these rules 
and procedures and, except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the 
consultations and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements. 
Accordingly, The DSB shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and 
Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and 
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concession and other obligations 
under the covered agreements‖ (WTO DSU 2008).  
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Only member states have the right to set off the DSB. Individuals or companies, who 
feel that their rights are being violated, must therefore convince their government to 
pursue the case (Hovi 1996: 334). The stages of the dispute settlement are as follows. 
a) Consultations 
 
When a complaint is made, the parties are instructed to hold bilateral consultations 
before the possible establishment of a panel, as article 4, point 3 explains:  
If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member 
to which the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the 
request within 10 days after the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations 
in good faith within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the 
request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If the Member does 
not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter 
into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise 
mutually agreed, after the date of receipt of the request, then the Member that 
requested the holding of consultations may proceed directly to request the 
establishment of a panel‖(WTO DSU 2008). 
One of the fundamental principals of GATT was that a voluntary, bilaterally 
negotiated solution was preferred over a panel dispute. The same applies to the WTO; 
the difference is that the WTO holds specific time limits and explicit rules concerning 
what happens if the deadlines are not upheld (Hovi 1996: 335, Lash 1999:5, 
Reinhardt 2001:176). It is however important to point to article 3 in the DSU, which 
states “if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures in good faith 
in an effort to resolve the dispute” (WTO DSU 2008). Legalization in the WTO is 
thus explicitly tied to a requirement that member states resolve their trade disputes 
through the DSS, not through unilateral determinations and responses. This provision 
is “aimed directly at the coercive tactics of the United States under section 301” 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000: 431).  
b) The establishment of a panel and the panel process 
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The establishment of a panel happens if 
the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the 
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the 
DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a 
panel‖(WTO DSU 2008).  
This request shall be made in writing and shall indicate whether consultations were 
held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly (ibid.). This gives each 
member country the right to get the request of a panel granted, which is a change from 
the GATT system, where requests like this had to be approved by consensus in the 
GATT Council and thus could be blocked by any member (Jackson 2006: 153).  The 
members of the panel shall be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of 
the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience, 
and citizens of members whose governments are parties to the dispute or third parties 
as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that 
dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise (WTO DSU 2008). 
Next, the dispute panel will share with the parties an interim report containing its 
findings and conclusions. The parties will have one week to comment on this report. 
The review period follows, which must not exceed two weeks. During that time, the 
panel may hold additional meetings with the disputing States. Then it will prepare a 
final report and submit it to the parties. Three weeks later, the final report will be 
circulated to all WTO members. Under DSU Article 16.4, the report will become a 
DSB ruling or recommendation within 60 days unless a consensus of the DSB rejects 
it or a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal to the 
Appellate Body. Either party has the right to appeal (Sarhan 2005; WTO DSU 2008).  
According to Jackson (2006) in this “perhaps the most critical stage of the dispute 
process”, the adoption stage, there has been a “dramatic” change compared to GATT 
(ibid: 156). Under GATT the “Council” used a consensus procedure for adoption, 
which meant that any member could block it. Under the WTO the final report will be 
 16 
adopted unless there is a consensus against it, which means virtual automatic adoption 
(ibid.). 
c) The appellate process 
 
Should one of the parties decide to appeal, the case is then handed over to the 
Appellate Body (AB). Even a “winner” can appeal, and this has sometimes been the 
case when the language of the panel report displeases even a winner, such as using 
grounds for a determination “that has long-range implications which bother the 
appealing disputant” (Jackson 2006: 157). The AB may “uphold, modify or reverse” 
legal findings of a panel, which has been taken to mean that there is no “remand” 
power (ibid: 158). When the AB‟s final report is completed, it is sent to the DSB for 
adoption, and like the process for panel report adoption, the procedure is automatic 
adoption with the reverse consensus. When the AB report is adopted, the ruling also 
adopts the panel report insofar as it is unchanged by the appeal report. (ibid.).  
According to Hovi (1996: 338), since the new WTO system automatically adopts the 
report, unless there is a consensus to reject it, there is a danger that reports can be 
adopted on failing legal grounds. The AB contributes to the reduction of this risk, and 
the appeal-feature was determined at the Uruguay Round to be necessary partly 
because of the automatic adoption of panel reports with no blocking permitted 
(Jackson 2006: 156).  
d) The implementation and compliance requirements  
 
The case then moves on to the implementation stage. The DSU will require a 
respondent country found to have violated WTO agreements to indicate what actions 
it plans to take to implement the recommendations. If immediate implementation is 
not practical, DSU Article 21 calls for implementation within a reasonable period of 
time. The length of this period will normally be proposed by the offending country 
and then approved by the DSB (Sarhan 2005; WTO DSU 2008).  
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There are two remedies available to a complaining State when the respondent State 
has failed to implement recommendations by the DSB or the Appellate Body within 
the reasonable period, as determined above. The first is compensation and the second 
is a "suspension of concessions" authorized in Article 22.2 of the DSU: 
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a 
covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the 
recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time determined 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no 
later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with 
any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to 
developing mutually acceptable compensation. 
If the parties do not agree about a compensation agreement within 20 days of the 
deadline, the complainant can ask for permission to retaliate. A consensus is needed 
to refuse such permission. Retaliations shall primarily be within the sector where the 
violation occurred (Hovi 1996: 338).  The DSU is explicitly stating that the various 
compensatory or “retaliation” measures are only temporary, pending full compliance 
(Jackson 2006: 159). The GATT had some possibilities for reciprocal and other 
measure to “encourage” compliance, but these were relatively weak. The WTO has on 
its side developed an elaborate set of possibilities for reacting to measures by WTO 
members which harm others (ibid: 196). The Dispute Settlement Body monitors how 
adopted rulings are implemented. Any outstanding case remains on its agenda until 
the issue is resolved. 
2.2 Main differences 
Obstructing the dispute settlement process requires the consensus of the WTO 
members. Consensus is needed to reject a request to establish a dispute panel; to reject 
a panel report; to reject a request to appeal; to reject the Appellate Body's report; and 
to reject a request for suspension of concessions. Consensus can rarely (if at all) be 
obtained as there normally is at least one party who has an interest in not rejecting one 
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of the above (either the complaining State or the offending State) (Sarhan 2005; 
Barton et al 2006: 71). A “Consensus- minus-two”- rule was suggested by the US at 
the early stages of the Uruguay-Round. This was not chosen. This rule would have 
entailed a possibility that a loosing country might persuade another country not to 
adopt the report, alternatively, another country with an interest in the case, and could 
help block the report (Hovi 1996: 337). Instead, the full consensus line was chosen. 
This is often referred to as “negative consensus” (Steinberg 2004:247).  Compared to 
GATT, the WTO system has turned the consensus rule up-side down, resulting in 
“almost automatic adoption” of a panel report (Jackson 2006: 144). It clarifies that all 
parts of the Uruguay Round legal text relevant to the matter in issue and argued by the 
parties can be considered in a particular dispute case (ibid.). Time limits have been 
made clearer and the right of a complaining government to have a panel process 
initiated has been clarified. The creation of a judicial body to which nations can 
appeal panel reports, The Appellate Body, is also a significant change. This Body is a 
substitution for some of the former procedures of the GATT Council approval of a 
panel report, and the reversed consensus also applies here, with “the ultimate result 
that the appellate report will come into force as a matter of international law in 
virtually every case” (ibid.). 
The international trade regime has with the creation of the WTO been legalized 
(Steinberg 2004: 247, Jackson 2006: 159, Goldstein et al 2000:389).  Legalization 
refers to “a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess, 
and these characteristics are defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision, 
and delegation” (Abbot et al 2000: 401). Obligation means that states or other actors 
are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, 
it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their 
behaviour there under is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and 
discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision means 
that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. 
Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, 
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interpret and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. 
These dimensions are pictured in figure 1(ibid.):  
 
Figure 1.  
The WTO is by Abbott et al (ibid.) said to administer a remarkably detailed set of 
legally binding international agreements and to operate a dispute settlement 
mechanism with significant authority to interpret and apply those agreements in the 
course of resolving particular disputes (ibid: 405). It therefore has a high score on all 
three dimensions. According to Kahler (2000), legalization contains an implicit 
promise: compared to institutions that do not share the characteristics of obligation, 
precision, and delegation, greater cooperative gains will be reaped by resolving 
collective action problems more efficiently (ibid: 673). In the following chapter I will 
discuss different theoretical assumptions on the effect of this legalization.  
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3. Legalization, Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism  
The topic of this thesis is the dispute settlement systems in the GATT and the WTO 
and how the new design of these procedures in the WTO might have affected member 
countries‟ compliance with the rules and rulings of the WTO. A major problem 
concerning compliance in international relations is the fact that “at the international 
level, there is no institution which can be relied upon to compel the signatories to 
comply with the agreement” (Hovi 1998: 77). According to Waltz, the international 
system is a self-help system (Waltz 1979), and a result of this is that international 
agreements are viable only to the extent that the parties voluntarily comply with their 
obligations (Hovi 1998: 77). There are different theoretical approaches to the 
likelihood of successful cooperation and the expected effect of an international 
organisation, and there has also been written extensively about the best way to design 
an organisation so as to ensure compliance. 
Is it possible to make sovereign states more compliant by changing the legal design of 
an international institution? Or will states follow the institution‟s rulings only when it 
is in their own self – interest? The theories I am going to base my hypotheses on are 
realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism. In the following pages, I will explain the 
expected effect of increased legalization held by these to theories. 
3.1 Realism and international institutions 
Despite of the shared assumptions, realists have responded rather critically to the 
institutional theory. Two of the most prominent critics are Joseph Grieco and John 
Mearsheimer. According to Grieco (1988: 488), realism encompasses five 
propositions: (1) States are the major actors in world affairs, (2) The international 
environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests or if 
they pursue objectives beyond their means, (3) International anarchy is the principal 
force shaping the motives and actions of states, (4) States in anarchy are preoccupied 
with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition and often 
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fail to cooperate even in the face of common interest, and (5) International institutions 
affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally (ibid).  
Realists claim that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in 
the world. They are based on the self interested calculations of great powers, and they 
have no independent effect on state behavior (Mearsheimer 1995: 7) The realist 
explanation of the great amount of time and attention spent on constructing legalized 
institutions, is that legal rules emanate from dominant powers and represent their 
interest. Legal rules that “work” bind the weaker members of the system; enforcement 
of those rules ultimately depends on willingness by stronger powers to bear the cost of 
enforceing legalization (Goldstein et al: 391). Realists believe that the design of the 
institution and the level of legalism in an organization have little or no impact on a 
state‟s behaviour, “except, perhaps, when a legalized regime is imposed by a more 
powerful state on the less powerful” (Kahler 2000:672).  
A realist view on international trade is what Gilpin (1987) calls economic 
nationalism. This view is critical of the liberal doctrine of free trade because the 
doctrine is politically naïve and fails to appreciate the extent to which the terms of 
trade and the rules governing trade are determined by the exercise of power (ibid: 
190).  
The realist view can be pictured as shown in figure 2. The thickness of the arrows 
indicates how strong the relationships between the parts are assumed to be.  
Figure 2: (Hovi & Underdal 2003: 181)  
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Realists do not claim that cooperation will not occur, but that it is difficult to achieve 
and particularly to sustain. There are two reasons for this, namely (1) relative – gains 
considerations and (2) concerns about cheating (Mearsheimer 1995: 12).  
1. Relative – gains considerations.  
Kenneth Waltz suggests that the first concern of states is not to maximize power but 
to maintain their position in the system (Waltz 1979: 126). This means that states seek 
to prevent increases in others‟ relative capabilities and that they assess their 
performance in any relationship in terms of the performance of others (Grieco 1988: 
499). Grieco suggests that states are positional, not atomistic in character and that 
state positionality may constrain the willingness of states to cooperate. A state will 
therefore decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a 
cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to 
achieve, relatively grater gains (ibid.). An important reason for this consideration is 
the uncertainty of future intentions of other states and one therefore pays close 
attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future. The 
uncertainty comes from the inability of states to predict or readily control the future 
leadership or interests of partners.  
Grieco contrasts the realist view with the neoliberal view and claims that  
while neoliberal institutional theory assumes that state utility functions are 
independent of one another and that states are indifferent to the payoffs of others, 
realist theory argues that state utility functions are at least partially interdependent 
and that one state‘s utility can affect another‘s (Grieco 1988: 501).  
2. Concerns about cheating.  
Concerns about cheating are often studied using a “prisoner‟s dilemma”-model. In 
this model two states can either cheat or cooperate with the other. Each side wants to 
maximize its own gain, but does not care about the size of the other‟s gain; each side 
cares about the other side only insofar as the other‟s side chosen strategy affects its 
own prospects for maximizing gain (Mearsheimer 1995: 17). The ideal outcome for a 
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state is therefore to “sucker” the other side into thinking it is going to cooperate, and 
then cheat. But since both sides understand this logic, and both sides “will therefore 
try to cheat the other and both side will therefore lead mutual cheating which leads to 
the worst possible outcome”1 (ibid.). Mearsheimer claims that since neoliberals argue 
that cheating is the only obstacle to cooperation, they claim that their theory applies to 
the economic but not the military realm. However, he says, when you take the relative 
gains consideration into the equation, concerns only with overcoming the problems 
with cheating become impossible since military might is highly connected with 
economic might, i.e. the relative size a state‟s economy has profound consequences 
for its standing in the international balance of military power (Mearsheimer 1995: 20). 
The relative gains consideration and concerns about cheating are therefore closely 
intertwined.  
Krasner (1983, in Steinberg & Zasloff 2006: 74) developed a structural realist view 
on international law and international organisations: state behaviour and associated 
international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law, but because 
international law mirrors the interests of powerful states, “international is merely an 
epiphenomenon of underlying power” (ibid.). Goldsmith and Posner (2005) 
developed this view further and claimed that state representatives only use the 
language of international law as a rhetorical device to justify their behaviour, which is 
in actual fact only motivated by the desire to serve their national interest.   
In summary, the realist views about the effects of legalization are: 
 Legalization will not cause Powerful to change their behavior. 
 Weaker states will choose to comply with the rulings of the WTO when faced 
with a stronger opponent.  
A “modern reprise” (Abbott & Snidal 2000: 422) of the realist view on compliance is 
the enforcement school, which claims that studies that demonstrate high levels of 
                                              
1 This is a mistake on Mearsheimers behalf. The result of the prisoner‟s dilemma is the second worst possible outcome.  
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compliance may suffer from a selection bias: Governments will only negotiate 
agreements and establish institutional rules that they fully intend to follow in any case 
(Downs et al 1996: 673). A high level of compliance with the WTO rulings could 
therefore result from the fact that legalization has not altered government behavior “in 
the slightest” (Kahler 2000: 673).   
In summary, the enforcement schools views about the effect of the legalization are:  
 In areas where a great change in domestic policy is needed, legalization will 
not affect countries behavior.  
 Change in a nation‟s trade policy as a result of a WTO dispute, can come from 
an already established intention of change prior to the dispute.  
3.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism and legalization 
Neoliberals answer the question “can organizations change the behaviour of states?” 
in the affirmative. In his book “International Institutions and State Power”, Robert 
Keohane gives the following account of neoliberal institutionalism (NLI): 
The principal thesis (…) is that variations in the institutionalization of world politics 
exert significant impacts on the behaviour of governments. In particular, patters of 
cooperation and discord can be understood only in the context of the institutions that 
help define the meaning and importance of state action (Keohane 1989: 2). 
This is not to say, according to Keohane, that states are always highly constrained by 
international institutions, nor that states ignore the effect of their actions on the wealth 
and power of other states (ibid.). The central argument for Keohane is that state 
actions depend to a considerable degree on prevailing institutional arrangements. 
Such arrangements affect  
 the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; 
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 the ability of governments to monitor others‟ compliance and to implement 
their own commitments – hence the ability to make credible commitments in 
the first place; and 
 prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements(ibid.).  
Keohane further points out that in order for the NLI perspective to be relevant, the 
following two conditions must pertain: 1) Actors must have some mutual interests and 
potentially gain from cooperation, 2) Variations in the degree of institutionalization 
must be substansial, because if the institutions of world politics were fixed, it would 
be pointless to emphasize institutional variations to account for variations in state 
behaviour (ibid.).    
In the context of the WTO, both of these two conditions are fulfilled. In economic 
terms, the benefits from trade accrue to consumers through greater choice and lower 
prices and to producers of exportable goods that find expanded markets. Economic 
theory suggests that trade openness is, in general, welfare enhancing by bringing 
better jobs, new products and higher levels of aggregate wealth (Barton et al 2006: 
29-30). However, trade is highly politicized, and politicians who want to keep open 
markets must assure that those who will benefit from openness have an avenue for 
political participation. The change in the United States in 1947 when entering GATT, 
from bilateral to multilateral trade bargaining, increased the flexibility to conclude 
trade deals, thereby affecting U.S. behaviour (ibid: 32).   
Where NLI differ from the realist arguments is not on its assumptions about actors, 
but rather on the exemplary problem in the international system: are states primarily 
concerned with market failure or with relative gains and distributional conflicts, and 
could issues be resolved through the voluntary acceptance of institutions that leave all 
actors better off, or would coercion and power be more important for determining 
outcomes? (Keohane et al 1998: 663).  NLI focuses, naturally, on the role of market 
failure and voluntary cooperation. The key terms for NLI are preferences, 
information, strategies and common knowledge (ibid: 678).  
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The NLI view on the relationship between states and organisation can be pictured as 
shown in figure 3. The thickness of arrows indicates the relationship, as in the realist 
model above: 
Figure 3 (Hovi & Underdal 2003: 183):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When explaining why states choose to create legalized dispute settlement systems, 
proponents of NLI point to a number of reasons. Abbott and Snidal (2000) operates 
with a “hard” and a “soft” version of legalization. Since WTO is within the confines 
of “hard law”, I will focus on the principles for this version: 
1) Legalization increases the credibility of the parties‟ commitments, constraining 
self serving auto-interpretation via the precision of individual commitments, 
the granting of interpretive authority to courts, lining out accepted modes of 
legal discourse and coherence between individual commitments and broader 
legal principles. The cost of reneging is also increased. With a hard law 
commitment, the reputational effect of violation can be generalized to all 
agreements subject to international law, which provides the very foundations 
for statehood (ibid: 427). 
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2) Legalization enhances the capacity for enforcement. Legal review allows 
allegations and defenses to be tested under accepted standards and procedures, 
thereby increasing the reputational cost if a violation is found (ibid). 
3) Legalization entails fixed consequences for legal violations. The 
“countermeasures” in the WTO legitimizes retaliation and clarify its intent, 
thereby reducing the costs and risk of self - help (ibid). 
4) By entailing a specific form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion 
in terms of applicable rules and pertinent fact, legalization largely disqualifies 
arguments based solely on interests and preferences (ibid:429). Legalization is 
an effective device for organizing ongoing interactions, because it implies that 
most disputes and questions of interpretation should be addressed through 
specialized procedures. If negotiated solutions are permitted, as in WTO, this 
means that states bargain “in the shadow” of anticipated legal decisions (ibid: 
431).  
5) On the domestic level, executive officials should look to hard international law 
when they want to change the views of other domestic agencies or political 
groups with diverging views. The same applies when executive officials have 
preferences that differ significantly from those of competing power centers. 
This perspective makes domestic politics and constitutional law significant 
explanatory variables (ibid: 430).  
6) When legal rules are in effect, unauthorized coercive behavior is generally seen 
as illegitimate (ibid: 431).  
NLIs do however state that these principles “may be ignored in practice, especially by 
powerful states” (ibid.).  They do nonetheless say that institutions can matter and that 
the level of legalism can affect a nation‟s behaviour and level of compliance2. The 
“negative consensus”-rule in the WTO, resulting in almost automatic adoption, is 
particularly relevant when it comes to constraining the above mentioned “self serving 
auto interpretation” and “arguments based solely on interests and preferences”.  
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In summary, neoliberal institutionalism suggests that the legalization of the WTO will 
increase compliance because increasing legalization entails: 
 Increasing reputational costs and credibility commitment.  
 Improves governments‟ ability to fend of domestic actors with diverging 
views.  
 The “negative consensus”-rule reduces the potential role of self-interest. 
  Clearer rules and regulations make it easier to monitor others compliance.  
My ambition with this study is not to prove one of the two theories “right” or 
“wrong”. The area of research and number of cases are too small for this to be done. I 
will however be able to see which of the theories outlined in this chapter best explains 
my findings in the cases I investigate. I will be able to se if the legalization of the 
WTO can contribute to level the international power-based playing field, which 
realists assume it will not, and if legalization can contribute to increased cooperation 
in line with the neoliberal assumption. In the following three chapters I will study the 
effect of the legalization of the WTO DSS in the three dispute pairs explained in 
chapter 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
2 It is important to say that these differences between realism and NLI are ideal types, and that the disagreement not 
necessarily is as big as pictured here. See Jervis 1999.  
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4. The “Japan Alcohol”-dispute 
The two disputes in this chapter deals with Japan‟s taxing of domestic and foreign 
alcohol products. The disputes I consider in this chapter are: 
A) The EEC versus JAPAN in 1987 under the GATT system. The dispute is 
“Japan - customs duties, taxes and labeling practices on imported wines and 
alcoholic beverages”. This will be referred to as “The GATT-alcohol”-dispute. 
B) The EU, Canada and USA versus Japan in 1996 under the WTO system. The 
dispute is “Japan - Taxes on alcoholic beverages”. This will be referred to as 
“The WTO-Alcohol”-dispute. 
Japan was as mentioned one of the countries pressing for legalization of the WTO 
DSS under the Uruguay Round, and the complaining parts in these two cases are, 
together with Japan, referred to as the “Quad”; Canada, United States and the EU. In 
2000, the “Quad‟s” combined share of the total GDP of all WTO members was 
roughly 81 % (Barton et al 2006: 13). This dispute pair therefore allows to test if the 
countries that pressed for the legalized system are willing to follow the legalized 
procedure and to abide by its rules. Also, in his research design, Zangl makes the 
assumption that if the legalization can affect the behavior of the United States, it is 
likely it will have “similar effects on the behavior of less powerful states as 
well”(ibid: 832). This case pair allows this assumption to be tested on Japan.   
4.1 “The GATT Alcohol”-dispute. 
In 1984, according to the 18
th
 General report of the Activities of the EU, the 
communities‟ trade deficit with Japan leveled off at around 13,000 million European 
currency units (ECU) as a result of a moderate overall increase in Japanese exports to 
the EC and a greater increase in EC exports to Japan (Keesing 1987: 35384). The EU 
attempted repeatedly during 1984-87 to encourage the Japanese government to open 
up its own market to EC goods, and on April 2, 1984, the EU commission submitted 
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to the Japanese authorities a new list of measures needed to open up the Japanese 
market, but by mid- 1985 both the EC Council of Foreign ministers and the European 
Council of EC heads of state and government criticized the Japanese authorities for 
their “absence of reaction” to such demands (ibid). Japan disagreed and said that the 
EU ignored the “solid results” achieved in the areas of establishing common 
standards, certification and product labeling and concerning the issue of government 
procurement (ibid). The EU Commission was not satisfied, and in October 1986 a 
commission paper on the opening up of the Japanese market urged a speedy removal 
of Japanese trade barriers on various products, and a specific complaint centered on a 
tax system in Japan which imposed a disproportionately high tax on the sale of 
European alcoholic beverages, particularly Scotch whisky and French cognac (ibid).   
The dispute was brought to GATT already on July 22 1986, when the European 
Communities requested consultations with Japan under article XXII:1 on Japanese 
customs duties, taxes and labeling practices on imported wines and alcoholic 
beverages. In a further communication dated 31 October 1986, the European 
Communities stated that  consultations between the EEC and Japan had not resulted in 
a satisfactory settlement and that the community wished to refer the matter to the  
GATT Contracting Parties in accordance with article XXIII:2 (GATT L/6216: 1). At 
the Council meeting on 5-6 of November 1986 The EU Community requested the 
establishment of a panel, but Japan replied that an examination under article XXIII:2 
would not help to produce a practical solution  to the politically and difficult process 
of tax reform in Japan and could not accept the establishment of a panel (ibid). At the 
council meeting on 21 November 1986, the community again requested the 
establishment of a panel. Japan considered that consultations had not been exhausted 
and that recourse to Article XXIII:2 and to the “urgency procedure” was inappropriate 
pending the outcome of the tax reform examination by the Japanese Government in 
December 1986 (ibid.)  
On December 19 1986, the Japanese Ministry of Finance presented to the EU 
Commission proposals on reforming the Japanese taxation system for wines and 
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spirits. These were rejected as inadequate by the Commission, which claimed that 
“whiskies and brandies of inferior grades produced in Japan will remain subject to 
much lower taxes than those applicable to imported products”. Tariff reductions of 
some 30 per cent were described as “a step in the right direction”, but the 
Commission declared that it would still pursue a test case alleging Japan‟s failure to 
effect satisfactory adjustment of its policies under article XXIII of the GATT 
(Keesing 1987: 35384). At the Council meeting on 4 February 1987, the Council 
agreed to establish a panel “to examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, 
the matter referred to the Contracting Parties by the European Communities in 
document L/6078 and to make such findings as will assist the Contracting Parties in 
making the recommendations giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2” 
(GATT L/6216: 1).  
4.1.1  Arguments by the parties  
The EC requested the panel find that the Japanese system of taxation was 
a) Discriminatory with regard to imported alcoholic beverages in contravention of 
the provisions of Article III:1 and 2. The discrimination was due to 1) the 
absence of uniformity in the Japanese system of taxing alcoholic beverages, 
which was characterized by a differing tax-assessment basis depending on 
established product-categories and which amounted to penalizing imported 
products viv-a-vis domestic producers, 2) the application of surprisingly 
different rates for similar products, based on a classification which resulted in 
a distinct heavier levy on imported products than on domestic products, 3) 
practices of the Japanese administration aimed at subjecting imported products 
to the highest taxation and 4) the aggravating impact of extremely high 
customs duties (ibid: 3-4). 
b) Wines and alcoholic beverages imported into Japan did not enjoy adequate 
protection as regards origin making. The Community considered that Japan 
had not fulfilled its obligations, with regard to Article IX:6,  in preventing 
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trade names of wines and alcoholic beverages originating in the community 
from being used in such manner as to misinterpret the true origin of the 
products (ibid).  
Japan, on their side, requested the panel to find that Japan‟s liquor tax did not 
discriminate between domestic and imported alcoholic beverages and was not applied 
in such a way as to afford protection to domestic production inconsistent with article 
III:1 and 2. Japan had also met its obligations under Article IX:6 by taking necessary 
measures to prevent misrepresentation of the true origin of alcoholic beverages which 
might be caused by labeling (ibid:10).  
4.1.2. Findings and conclusions by the panel 
Argentina, Canada, Finland, The United States and Yugoslavia gave submissions as 
interested third parties and all, in a more or less direct language, supported the EC in 
their claims against Japan (ibid: 19).The international pressure on Japan was thus 
increased. The GATT- panel noted that the dispute was due to diverging views of the 
European Communities and Japan on the interpretation of GATT Article III:1 and 2, 
which reads: 
1.         The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal 
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in 
specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic production.  
2.         The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to 
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall 
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic 
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products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1 (GATT 
1947). 
The Contracting Parties had never developed a general definition of the term “like 
products” in Article III:2, and drafting history confirms that the article was designed 
with “the intention that internal taxes on goods should not be used as a means of 
protection” (GATT L/6216: 23-4). Past decisions on this question were made on a 
case-by-case basis after examining relevant factors (ibid.). The panel decided to agree 
with the interpretation laid forward by the EC. The panel concluded, first, that Japan 
was not in violation of Article IX:6, but with regards to Article III:2, it found that 
“whiskies, brandies, other distilled spirits, liqueurs and sparkling wines imported into 
Japan were subject to discriminatory or protective taxes contrary to the article, and the 
panel therefore suggested that the Contracting Parties should recommend that Japan 
brought its taxes on the mentioned alcohol products in conformity with its obligation 
under the General Agreement (ibid:32; The Boston Globe 1987).  
4.1.3. Actions taken by Japan  
Already before the GATT recommendation, Japanese business leaders urged their 
government to cut taxes on imported alcohol, and stressed that the EC regarded the 
issue as a symbol of the obstacles to penetration of the Japanese market, and that 
imported alcohol had too high custom duties (Chicago Sun-Times 1987). Thus, the 
Japanese Government was under pressure from both foreign and domestic actors. And 
the Japanese did indeed something with their taxes on imported alcohol product. In 
1988, the Japanese prime minister launched a tax reform package that was welcomed 
among Scottish whisky producers. Previously, Scottish whisky was taxed higher than 
Japanese, but after the reform the tax discrimination would be abolished and 
importers would compete on equal terms (Economist 1988) Whisky would however 
be taxed higher than neutral brown spirit, and there was the possibility that Japanese 
firms move their whisky to this low-taxed category, and then the importers again 
would be competing against brands that have a head start from the tax system. The 
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importers, however, reckoned that the tax authorities in the Ministry of Finance would 
stop its liberalization being so easily foiled (ibid).  
On 2 February 1989, the Government of Japan informed the Contracting Parties that 
the ad valorem tax and the grading system had been abolished, resulting in a single 
rate for all grades of whisky/brandies, and that the changes had been considerably 
reduced by decreasing the specific tax rate for whisky/brandies and raising that on 
shochu
3
(WTO Panel Report DS8/10/11: 12). Japan said that these changes were made 
with a view to implementing the recommendations adopted by the GATT Council 
mentioned.  
The EC did seem to be satisfied with the Japanese solution. In august 1990, the EC 
delegate to the GATT told the council meeting that Japan had achieved “impressive 
results” in cutting restrictions on imports of wine and alcohol. The protections against 
other merchandise, though, were too high (New York Times 1990). The US delegate 
expressed the same sentiments and said that despite some progress, much remained to 
be done (ibid). The steps taken by Japan were seen as a step in the right direction by 
its trading partners, but clearly not enough.  
According to an accord between Japan, US, EC and Canada unveiled in July 1993, 
tariffs would be scrapped entirely on pharmaceuticals, construction equipment, 
medical equipment, beer, and most furniture, farm equipment and alcohol (Chicago 
Sun-Times 1993). Japan did however not deliver, and the satisfaction regarding the 
Japanese policy towards alcohol imports vanished. In February 1994, the International 
Herald Tribune (1994) reported that “The United States and Europe had been pressing 
Japan to make bigger cuts in its tariffs on wood, white alcohols such as gin and 
vodka, and on leather and footwear than it had promised in December”(ibid.). "That 
hasn't happened, and at this point it's hard to be optimistic about it," John Schmidt, the 
chief U.S. negotiator for the Uruguay Round, said (ibid). In May 1994, the Liquor 
Tax Law was further amended to raise tax rates on shochu and on spirits, while 
                                              
3 A potato-based spirit (Economist 1995) 
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whisky rates remained unchanged (WTO Panel Report DS8/10/11:13). However, this 
was not enough to settle the “alcoholic tension” between the east and the west, and 
one and a half years later the parties engaged in a new dispute. And this time, the 
dispute was to be settled under a mutually agreed legalized system.  
4.2 “The WTO Alcohol”-dispute. 
Since the GATT ruling in 1987, Japan had made two reforms on its alcohol tax 
system, and claimed that their taxes now conformed to WTO rules. The EC, US and 
Canada, thought otherwise (Economist 1995). Also, on the domestic level, “all 
interested parties in Japan had already noted the enormous tax difference, which was 
a glaring example of domestic production at the expense of foreign products 
(Pekkanen 2001: 65). The dispute, which actually is three disputes treated as one, 
started June 21 1995 when the EC requested consultations, and Canada and the US 
followed on 7 July 1995. The complainants claimed that spirits exported to Japan 
were discriminated against under the Japanese liquor tax system which, in their view, 
levies a substantially lower tax on “shochu” than on whisky, cognac and white spirits 
(WTO 2008). The “WTO-Alcohol”-dispute clearly builds upon the “GATT-Alcohol”-
dispute. The Panel Report from 1987 and its conclusions thus became disputed. The 
EC said that since the Liquor Tax law had been changed, requesting the 
implementation of the 1987 Panel report was not enough; the establishment of a new 
panel was needed. The US on their side, said that the 1987 Report offered excellent 
guidance, and urged the Panel to complete the job started in 1987; to find that Japan‟s 
taxes were discriminatory and inconsistent with Article III:2.  Canada wanted the case 
to be directed by the 1987 report and that the factors articulated in the 1987 Report 
are determinative of the inconsistency of the Liquor Tax Law (WTO Panel Report 
DS8/10/11:15-16). Japan, on their side, claimed that that the findings in 1992 Malt 
Beverages had overturned the 1987 Report, that the findings in the 1987 Panel report 
should not guide deliberations of the present Panel, and that the present dispute were 
different from the “GATT-Alcohol”-dispute (ibid: 16-17). 
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According to Palmeter and Mavrodis (1998) “other than the texts of the WTO 
Agreements themselves, no source of law is as important in WTO dispute settlement 
as the reported decisions of prior dispute settlement panels(…)include the reports of 
GATT” (ibid: 400). In the “WTO-alcohol”-dispute, the WTO panel declined to follow 
the reasoning of two prior GATT panels because it was not persuaded by the 
reasoning in one and disagreed with the interpretation of the term “like product” in 
the other
4
 (ibid: 403). The WTO Panel therefore showed that it was independent of 
previous disputes concerning the same GATT articles. When it comes to the “GATT-
Alcohol”-case and its factual findings, the WTO Panel said that after “following its 
independent considerations of the factors mentioned in the 1987 Panel Report”, the 
Panel agreed with the findings in the 1987 Panel Report, and that the responding 
member had “offered no further convincing evidence that the conclusion reached by 
the 1987 Panel Report was wrong” (WTO Panel Report DS8/10/11: 104). It did 
however state that “one case alone did not constitute a practice under the agreement” 
(Jackson 2006: 176) and the WTO Panel made its considerations of the facts in the 
dispute on an independent level. However, according to Jackson, this does not say 
that a prior case is irrelevant and it does create an “amount of precedent value” (ibid: 
168). This could explain why Japan wanted the findings of the 1987 Report not to be 
considered.  
4.2.1 Findings and conclusions of the Panel 
The conclusions of the panel were the following: 
a) Shochu and vodka are like products and Japan, by taxing the latter in excess of 
the former, is in violation of its obligation under Article III: 2, of GATT 1994 
b) Shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs are “directly 
competitive or substitutable products” and Japan, by not taxing them similarly, 
                                              
4 The reports were ”United States - Taxes on Automobiles” and “1992 Malt Beverages”, respectively (WTO Panel Report 
DS8/10/11: 101) 
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is in violation of its obligation under Article III: 2, second sentence, of GATT 
1994 (WTO AB-1996-2: 1-2) 
The Panel then recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request Japan to bring 
the Liquor Tax Law into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994 (ibid.). In 
other words, the Complainants had won the dispute. However, it was not over, and on 
August 11 1996 Japan filed an appeal. Even though it supported the overall 
conclusion, the United States also appealed the Panel Report, because it found several 
errors in the findings of the Panel and the legal interpretations developed by the Panel 
in reaching its conclusions in the Panel Report. This case was one of the first to be 
handled by the new DSS, and the second time the Appellate Body (AB) had been used 
(Van den Bossche 2006: 307). Where the appeal by Japan is critical of the Panel 
Reports findings and interpretations related to the products in this specific case, the 
appeal by the United States is based on criticism on the more general level of treaty 
interpretation. The United States claimed 
that the Panel erred in incorrectly characterizing adopted panel reports as 
"subsequent practice" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention").12 According to the 
United States, adopted panel reports serve only to clarify, for the purposes of the 
particular dispute, the application of the rights and obligations of the parties to that 
dispute to the precise set of circumstances at that time (WTO AB-1996-2: 4) 
Clearly, the United States did not want this case to create precedence in WTO 
disputes and saw that the this case could have long term implications that could later 
be used against them.  
The AB‟s Report affirmed the Panel‟s conclusion that the Japanese Liquor Tax Law 
is inconsistent with GATT Article III:2, but pointed out several areas where the Panel 
had erred in its legal reasoning, mainly on the complaints made by the United States. 
The Appellate Report, together with the Panel Report as modified by the Appellate 
Report, was adopted on 1 November 1996 (ibid.).  
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4.2.2 Actions taken by Japan 
Japan first claimed that immediate compliance was “ordinarily almost impossible” 
and stated that it required up to five years to implement the recommended increase in 
taxes, because of its government‟s parliamentary minority and the effect of the 
proposed legislation on the liquor producing industry (Stoll & Steinmann 1999: 415). 
The Arbitrator found the reasonable period for implementation of the 
recommendations to be 15 months from the date of adoption of the reports i.e. it 
expired on 1 February 1998. Japan presented modalities for implementation which 
were accepted by the complainants (WTO DS8). Japan did deliver. 
European Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, who were in charge of external trade, said 
that “through the WTO the EU has succeeded in forcing changes to Japan's liquor tax 
laws“(Xinhua English Newswire 1997). After the lost trade dispute over tax rates on 
its shochu distilled spirits, Japan agreed to slash taxes on imports by 58%, and raise 
taxes on shochu (European Report 1999). It implemented its tax reform in three 
stages, starting October 1, 1997, second reform on May 1, 1998 and promised to 
implement the third and final stage of the reform on October 1 2000, at which the 
time rate for the remaining category of shochu would be harmonized with the existing 
rates for all other distilled spirits (Orr 1999).  
4.3. Comparing the GATT and the WTO disputes 
Looking at the “GATT-Alcohol”-dispute and the “WTO-alcohol”-dispute, one can 
almost say that the one led to the other. The fact that the complaining parties took the 
case to the WTO after they had tried it under the GATT shows that they were neither 
willing to yield nor that they were satisfied with the result of the GATT dispute. The 
time aspect of this case is relevant, and so is the increased pressure laid on Japan due 
to the fact that both Canada and the United States joined the EU as actual 
complainants in the WTO dispute and not just third parties as they were in the GATT 
dispute. Both these factors contributed to the Japanese compliance. But the legalized 
WTO DSS still played a prominent role.  
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Japan was going to reform its Liquor Tax Law in 1986 and did complete the reform in 
1989 and followed with a reform in 1994. The planning of the 1986 Reform had 
therefore started after the EC had requested consultations under GATT, and Japan did 
block the formation of a panel for more than six months, relying on diplomacy outside 
the GATT to solve the case. When they were ruled against in the GATT, the reform 
they passed in 1989 was already planned on the domestic level. The revenue from the 
Liquor Tax was the third most important revenue source after the income tax and the 
corporation tax in 1985, amounting to 4.9 per cent of the total revenue (Panel report 
L/6216: 2), so this was clearly an important subject for the Japanese Government. 
When looking at the rhetoric used by the complainants in the “WTO-Alcohol”-
dispute, one can see that they had not forgotten about the 1987 Panel Report, and the 
three complainants still requested that the WTO Panel find that Japan still violated its 
obligations. Although the EC said that since the Tax Law had been changed a new 
panel was needed, the arguments were the same. And Japan on their side still 
requested the Panel to find that its taxation system did not violate Article III.  In both 
disputes, the panels stated that the dispute concerned the interpretation of Article III, 
and especially the term “like products”. In the 1987 Panel Report, “the Panel found 
that the traditional Japanese consumer habits with regard to shochu provided no 
reason for not considering vodka to be a like product” (Panel report L/6216: 25).  
In the “WTO-Alcohol”-dispute, Japan argued that spirits, whisky/brandy and liqueurs 
are not “like products” to either category of shochu, within the meaning of Article 
III:2, first sentence, nor are they “directly competitive or substitutable product” to 
shochu, within the meaning of article III:2, second sentence (WTO Panel Report 
DS8/10/11: 96) Japan later argued before the AB “that "shochu" and whiskey were 
unlike products and it was basically a beverage for poorer people”(Xinhua English 
Newswire 1996). In 1985, the grading system pursues the objective of levying a high 
tax and high priced whiskies/brandies and an appropriately lower tax in regard to low 
quality and low priced whiskies/brandies largely drunk by people in the lower income 
bracket (Panel report L/6216: 3). Japan‟s taxing system therefore had a social side to 
it. Jackson (2006) points out that this dispute touches on certain cultural attributes of 
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consumers, which can play a part in treaty interpretation (ibid: 187). The AB stated in 
this dispute that the term “like product” requires the AB to examine the phrase on a 
“case by case basis” and that the context of the language was crucial (ibid: 186). In 
this dispute, the products in question were found to be like products by both the 
GATT system and the WTO system. Japan had clearly lost.  
 The AB then stated that 
The WTO agreement is a treaty - the international equivalent of a contract. It is self 
evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective 
national interest, the members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the 
benefits they expect to derive as members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise 
their sovereignty according to the commitments they have made in the WTO 
agreement‖ (Marceau 2006: 341).  
With this statement, the AB clearly plays on the credibility of the parties‟ 
commitment. The principles for “hard” legalization set forward by neoliberals in 
chapter 3 are all working together in the “WTO-alcohol”-dispute. The GATT system 
made it possible for Japan to follow some of its own national interest when it comes 
to alcohol policy, since the GATT system always were based on consensus, 
negotiations and political compromise (Hovi 1996: 335). Japan could therefore under 
the GATT system change their Tax Law to the extent they found proper and in line 
with their domestic view. Under the WTO, they had to comply with the international 
agreement to a greater degree and their domestic alcohol policy was now affected not 
only by their national preferences, but also by the Dispute Settlement System of the 
WTO.  
The Complainants were quite satisfied with WTO. As Mark Z. Orr, the Vice President 
of International and Trade with the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States says:  
For the U.S. distilled spirits industry, The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has 
worked, and worked very well. At our request, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative(USTR) has initiated or participated in dispute settlement proceedings 
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against the discriminatory tax measures imposed on imported distilled spirits 
products by Japan(…)A partial reform enacted in 1989 eliminated the most overtly 
discriminatory elements of the system, but left the system in place in its basic form. 
Subsequent efforts to persuade Japan to eliminate the remaining discrimination 
against imports proved fruitless(…)The leverage provided by the WTO dispute 
settlement allowed USTR negotiators to secure the U.S. distilled spirits industry‘s 
two primary market access objectives in Japan- the establishment of a 
nondiscriminatory tax regime in which U.S. distilled spirits products are taxed 
equally with domestic Japanese products and the elimination of tariffs on all U.S. 
distilled spirits to Japan (Orr 1999).   
In 2008, the AP Worldstream  could tell us that “The U.S., the 27-nation EU and 
Japan, by contrast, allow nearly all spirits to enter their markets duty-free” (AP 
Worldstream  2008). Were GATT made Japan do something, but still not follow the 
1987 Report completely, the WTO dispute resulted in Japan acting in accordance with 
the international organization‟s law and to the satisfaction of the complainants. The 
assumption held by Zangl that smaller states will change their behavior due to 
legalization, is in this case valid.   
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5. The “US lumber”-dispute 
The disputes in focus in this chapter concern a lengthy trade dispute between Canada 
and the United States. The topic of the disputes is softwood lumber from Canada. The 
dispute pair is actually two disputes under the GATT and six disputes under the 
WTO. I will for the purpose of this thesis treat these disputes as two, one under the 
GATT and one under the WTO. The disputes are: 
A) Canada versus the United States in 1987 and 1993 under the GATT system. 
The disputes are “United States - Initiation of a countervailing duty 
investigation into softwood lumber product from Canada‖ from 1987, and 
“United States - Measures affecting imports of softwood lumber from Canada‖ 
from 1993. These disputes will be referred to as “The GATT lumber”-dispute. 
B) Canada versus the United States from 2001 to 2006 under the WTO system. 
The first dispute, which later became several cases which I will describe 
below, were “United States — Preliminary Determinations with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada‖. This, and the following disputes, 
will be referred to as “The WTO lumber”-dispute. 
In Zangl‟s article, he points out that one of the weaknesses with his study is “that it 
would have been preferable to focus on a less powerful contender than the EU to test 
whether the judicialization of GATT/WTO procedures has had an effect on U.S. 
behavior towards both powerful and less powerful disputants” (Zangl 2008: 832). 
This dispute allows for that test to be made. The US - Canada softwood lumber 
dispute has been described as “the long-running and rancorous battle” that “stands out 
as the United States‟ largest single trade dispute with its largest trade partner” 
(Lindsey et al 2000: 2), and as a “dispute so long running that interested parties rely 
on dynastic nomenclature to catalog the sordid details” (Ikenson 2005).  It can 
therefore be considered ideal for the research question of this thesis, since it in 
addition to be treated under both GATT and WTO is a trade dispute where the single 
most powerful state in the world is the respondent.  
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At the core of the dispute, is the word “stumpage”. This refers to the fee Canadian 
lumber producers pay for the right to harvest trees from federally or provincially 
owned property known as “Crown Lands”. In contrast, US trees are harvested from 
privately owned land.  American lumber interests assert that the effective rate of 
stumpage is below market value and therefore constitutes a subsidy. They also 
maintain that lax reforestation and other ancillary obligations contribute to 
subsidization and that, in addition, individual Canadian lumber producers price their 
products so as to dump softwood lumber in the American market (Carmody 2006: 
666).   
5.1 The “GATT Lumber”- dispute 
This dispute can be dated back many decades, but it significantly heated up in 1982, 
and in 1983 the first countervailing duty (CVD) case was initiated by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (USDOC) (Lindsey et al: 2).Countervailing duties, a tariff, 
is U.S. domestic firms‟ legal recourse against subsidized imports. Domestic firms 
initiate the legal process by filing a petition with the USDOC and the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that imports have been subsidized by 
a foreign government. If USDOC determines that the imports have been subsidized 
and if the ITC rules that the domestic industry has been injured as a result of the 
imports, tariffs of the magnitude of the subsidy margin (determined by USDOC) will 
be imposed (Irwin 2002: 112).   This investigation found that Canada did not violate 
US law with regards to subsidies (Lindsey et al: 2). 
On September 26, 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney requested the 
opening of trade talks with the U.S., where free trade was the gist of the request. One 
of the reasons for this decision by Canada was the concern over growing US 
protectionism, including lumber imports from Canada. In addition, the Canadian 
economy had for the prior ten years been performing badly (Weintraub 1986: 101). 
Then, in the spring of 1986, the USDOC reversed itself in a second CVD 
investigation and found that Canadian stumpage rates conferred a 15 % subsidy 
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(Lindsey 2000: 3). This led the US Reagan administration to impose duties on 
Canadian shingles and "shakes" - rough-hewn shingles, which two weeks later, in 
June, led Canada to slap tariffs on American-made computer parts, semiconductors 
and books and increased import fees on a number of other items (Browning 1986, 
Begley et al 1998: 209). 
Less than two months later, the dispute was brought before GATT:  
―In a communication dated 30 July 1986 (document SCM/76), Canada requested the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("the Committee"') to 
establish a Panel to examine a dispute between Canada and the United States 
concerning the decision taken by the United States on 5 June 1986 to initiate a 
countervailing duty investigation on imports of softwood lumber products from 
Canada‖ (GATT SCM/83:1).  
The Committee agreed to establish a panel on 1 august 1986. This was not blocked by 
the United States. The dispute then entered the consultation phase. The parties of the 
dispute, the terms of reference and the composition of the panel was then decided. 
The Panel met with the parties three times during the autumn of 1986. The Canadian 
view was that 
There had been no material changes in the United States countervailing duty law and 
consequently there was insufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy to justify the 
opening of a new investigation by the United States. Canada therefore considered 
that, in initiating a second investigation of these practices, the United States had 
acted in violation of Article 2:1 of the Code (ibid: 2). 
In January 1987, the Panel was informed by Canada and the United States that a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of the dispute had been reached. The case therefore 
never reached the adjudication phase.  A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between the two countries was presented to the panel. The MOU stated that 
Under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, the United States is required 
to release bonds and refund deposits made pursuant to the preliminary affirmative 
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countervailing duty determination, and to state in the notice of termination of the 
investigation that this preliminary determination is henceforth without legal force 
and effect. Canada has undertaken to collect an export charge of 15 per cent ad 
valorem on exports of certain softwood lumber products made on or after 8 January 
1987 from Canada to the United States (GATT SCM/83: 2)  
 
The two Governments would consult semi-annually and otherwise at the request of 
either Government regarding any matter concerning the MOU, and the MOU could be 
terminated upon thirty days written notice by either Government (ibid.). The 
diplomacy of the GATT clearly prevented an escalation of this dispute.   
 
In the time between this dispute and the one explained below, Canada and the United 
States  signed a free trade agreement (1988) (Irwin 2002:140). Canadian officials and 
export manufacturers obtained significant support from important segments of the 
Canadian agricultural community for their view that a trade agreement was needed, 
both to stem US protectionism and enhance needed access (Skogstad 1992: 324). The 
election held in 1988 in Canada was also seen as an election on the Free Trade 
Agreement (Irwin 2002: 140). Canada unilaterally terminated the MOU in 1991, 
giving notice to U.S. 3 September (Panel Report SCM/162). The U.S. government 
responded immediately (4 October) by imposing interim duties on Canadian lumber 
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and then initiated a new CVD 
investigation (Lindsey et al 2000: 3). On October 8 1991, Canada requested 
consultations with the United States under Article 3:1 of the Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT (GATT 
SCM/162: 2).  
 
The dispute before the Panel concerned (i) the suspension of liquidation and 
imposition of bonding requirements by the United States on 4 October 1991 under 
Section 304 of the Trade Act 1974 with respect to imports of softwood lumber from 
Canada, and (ii) the initiation by the United States on 31 October 1991 of a 
countervailing duty investigation on imports of softwood lumber from Canada (ibid.).   
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This dispute started in 1991, which was after the mentioned 1989 GATT reform 
DSPI. The possibility for U.S. to block the panel was therefore not present. The 
dispute then entered the consultations phase. Canada requested the panel to find that 
 
The measures taken by the United States on 4 October 1991 in the form of a 
suspension of liquidation of entries of softwood lumber products from Canada and 
the imposition of bonding requirements on such entries were inconsistent with the 
obligations of the United States under Article 5:1, and were not justifiable as a form 
of "expeditious action" under Article 4:6 of the Agreement (GATT SCM/162: 8). 
 
On these grounds, Canada wanted the panel to recommend that 
 
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures request the United States 
(1) to withdraw the bonding requirements imposed on 4 October 1991, release the 
bonds, refund with interest any cash deposits and amounts collected, and terminate 
the suspension of liquidation of entries of softwood lumber from Canada ordered on 
4 October 1991, and (2) to terminate the countervailing duty investigation initiated 
on 31 October 1991 with respect to imports of softwood lumber from Canada (ibid.: 
9). 
 
The United States requested the Panel to find  
 
that the measures taken on 4 October 1991 with respect to entries of softwood lumber 
products from Canada were fully consistent with Article 4:6 of the Agreement, and 
that the self-initiation on 31 October 1991 of a countervailing duty investigation of 
imports of softwood lumber products from Canada was fully consistent with the 
obligations of the United States under Article 2:1 of the Agreement (ibid.)  
 
Japan presented arguments as an interested third party. They submitted their support 
of the Canadian claims that the measures taken by the U.S. on 4 October 1991 with 
respect to imports of softwood lumber from Canada were inconsistent with the 
obligations of the U.S. under the agreement, and that the CVD investigation had been 
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initiated in the absence of sufficient evidence (ibid: 89). The report of the Panel was 
adopted on 27 October 1993 and concluded that 
 
(a) the interim measures taken by the United States on 4 October 1991 with respect to 
imports of softwood lumber from Canada were inconsistent with Article 5:1 and 
could not be justified on the basis of Article 4:6 of the Agreement; and 
(b) the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation by the United States on 31 
October 1991 with respect to imports of softwood lumber from Canada was not 
inconsistent with the requirements of Article 2:1 of the Agreement (ibid: 117). 
 
The Panel therefore recommended to the Committee to request the United States, with 
respect to imports of softwood lumber from Canada, to terminate the bonding 
requirement, release any bonds, refund any cash deposits and terminate the 
suspension of liquidation of entries made during the period of application of the 
inconsistent interim measures imposed in October 1991 under the authority of Section 
304 of the Trade Act of 1974 (ibid: 118). Canada had succeeded in their fight against 
their mighty neighbor. Would the United States so comply with the ruling?  
  
5.1.2 Actions by the U.S. and the SLA of 1996 
The US agreed to refund more than $800 million in duties collected, and both 
countries agreed to enter into a “dialogue” on future lumber negotiations (Lindsey et 
al 2002: 3). The GATT adjudication had clearly worked for Canada. Canada and the 
United States later reached an agreement referred to as the Softwood Lumber 
agreement (SLA), which were to run from 1 April 1996 to 31 March 2001. The SLA 
imposed high duties on any imports of Canadian lumber above a certain threshold. 
Anything over 14, 7 billion board feet of lumber per year were subject to duties (Irwin 
2002: 59, Lindsey et al 2000: 3). Canada agreed to the SLA because of the fear of 
another CVD case, which had been costly on the Canadian softwood lumber industry 
and to avoid changes to U.S. trade law which neutralized Canada's victory in last 
lumber case (Lindsey et al 2000: 3, Campbell 2005). And as part of the agreement, the 
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U.S. agreed not to pursue trade remedy actions under the CVD or other trade laws, 
and also terminated all actions brought by the American lumber industry in U.S. 
courts (Lindsey et al 2002:3, Carmody 2006: 666).  
 
When the SLA expired 31 March 2001, Canadian lumber producers were allowed to 
export softwood lumber to the U.S. without limit (Carmody 2006: 666). In response 
the U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports immediately filed a countervailing duty 
petition. On May 23 the ITC made a preliminary determination that while Canadian 
softwood lumber exports to the United States were not injuring the domestic industry, 
there was a threat of material injury. This determination was followed on August 9 by 
the DOC's preliminary determination that Canadian softwood lumber exports to the 
United States were being subsidized at the rate of 19.31% (Carmody 2006: 666, 
Ikenson 2005). This led to the “WTO softwood lumber”-dispute.  
 
5.2. The “WTO lumber”- dispute 
This dispute includes six disputes from 2001 to 2006.  As mentioned, this dispute is 
one of the largest to involve the United States. What makes the dispute even larger is 
that it has been treated under both the WTO‟s and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement‟s (NAFTA) dispute settlement systems. Since this thesis is about the 
WTO DSS, I will refrain from discussing the proceedings under NAFTA. According 
to Carmody (2006) the difference between the two agreements is that the WTO 
Agreement establishes a regime of international law, whereas NAFTA Chapter 19 
refers back to a country's own domestic law (ibid:672). In the following pages I will 
briefly explain the relevant details of each WTO dispute chronologically:  
1) DS236 - Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada 
It started with dispute DS236 on 21 August 2001, when Canada requested 
consultations with the US concerning the preliminary countervailing duty 
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determination and the preliminary critical circumstances determination made by the 
US Department of Commerce on 9 August 2001, with respect to certain softwood 
lumber from Canada (WTO 2008). On 17 September 2001, Canada and the U.S. held 
consultations but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter. On 
25 October, Canada requested the establishment of a panel to examine the matter and 
on 5 December 2001 the DSB established a panel (Panel Report WT/DS236/R: 1).  
Canada requested the panel to find that the preliminary countervailing duty 
determination violated 7 different articles in the SCM agreement and article VI:3 of 
GATT 1994, and that US countervailing duty law regarding expedited and 
administrative reviews and the application of that law in the case resulted in failure by 
the U.S. to ensure that its laws, regulations and administrative procedures were in 
conformity with its WTO obligations under both the WTO and SCM agreements 
(Panel Report WT/DS236/R: 3). Canada therefore wanted the panel to 
 
recommend that the United States bring its measures into conformity with the SCM 
Agreement and the WTO Agreement, including by lifting the suspension of liquidation 
for the period of 19 May through 16 August 2001, and making company-specific 
expedited and administrative reviews available to exporters and producers subject to 
any countervailing duty order that may be issued as a result of the Lumber IV 
investigation. (Panel Report WT/DS236/R: 3).  
 
The Unites States requested that the Panel reject Canada's claims in their entirety. 
During the time of the investigation and decision making of this case, both the DOC 
and the ITC made their investigations into Canadian lumber producers, and the result 
was a final CVD rate of 18.79 percent and an average final antidumping rate of 8,4 
percent, for a combined average total rate of 27,22 percent. This had an impact on the 
Canadian industry and some smaller mills and related businesses were forced to shut 
(Carmody 2006: 667). 
On 27 September 2002, the Panel Report was circulated. The Panel held that the 
Canadian provincial stumpage programs were a "financial contribution”, but 
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nevertheless concluded that the USDOC‟s imposition of provisional measures based 
on the preliminary countervailing duty determination was inconsistent with the US 
obligations under Articles 1.1 (b), 10, 14, 14 (d), and 17.1(b) of the SCM Agreement 
(WTO DS236, Carmody 2006: 666). Canada's International Trade Minister, Pierre 
Pettigrew said in a release that "WTO has found in favor of our position that the U.S. 
preliminary subsidy determination was flawed and disproves the methods of 
calculation (…) this decision reinforces our position" (Resource News International 
2002). Canada had won the first battle, but there was more to come. The United States 
namely stated that the measures at issue in this dispute were no longer in effect and 
that no action was required to implement the report. Canada on their side claimed that 
the U.S. policies deemed illegal by the Panel remained unchanged (WTO DS236). 
And already before the circulation of the report, Canada had initiated more disputes 
on the same matter. Neither side was ready to give up.  
 
2) DS247 - Provisional Anti-Dumping Measure on Imports of Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada 
On 6 March 2002, Canada requested consultations under Article 4.8 of the DSU 
(urgency procedure) with the United States regarding an anti-dumping measure 
applied by the US to imports of softwood lumber from Canada. The US, although 
accepting the request for consultations, however did not accept that this was a case of 
urgency for the purpose of Article 4.8 of the DSU (WTO DS247). Canada could have 
used the article 4.3 in the WTO DSU to make this request into a dispute, but did not. 
Most likely, they decided to use their resources on the next case; DS257.   
 
3) DS257 - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada 
On 3 May 2002, Canada requested consultations with the US. The request concerned 
the final affirmative countervailing duty determination by the US Department of 
Commerce issued on 25 March 2002, with respect to certain softwood lumber from 
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Canada (WTO DS257). On 18 July 2002, Canada requested the establishment of a 
panel. The establishment of a panel was deferred by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) until 1 October 2002, when it was finally established. The EC, India and Japan 
reserved their third-party rights to participate in the panel proceedings. On 8 
November 2002, the panel was composed. On 29 August 2003, the Panel report was 
circulated to Members. The Panel found that  
 
the USDOC Final Countervailing Duty Determination was inconsistent with Articles 
10, 14, 14(d) and 32.1 SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of GATT 1994. The Panel 
decided to apply judicial economy as regards Canada‘s claims under Article 19.4 
SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of GATT 1994 concerning the methodologies used 
to calculate the subsidy rate; and its claims of violation of the procedural rules of 
evidence set forth in Article 12 SCM Agreement. Further to Canada‘s statement at 
the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties that it did not consider it 
appropriate to press its claims under Articles 10, 11.4 and 32.1 of the SCM 
Agreement concerning the initiation of the investigation, the Panel also refrain from 
addressing and making a ruling on these claims. (WTO DS257). 
 
The Panel recommended that the DSB requests the United States to bring its measure 
into conformity with its obligations under the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994. The 
U.S. decided to appeal, after withdrawing its appeal once, on 21 October 2003. The 
Appellate Body (AB) report was circulated to members on 19 January 2004 (due to 
the time required for completion and translation of the Report, the AB had informed 
that the normal 60- day period would not be upheld).  The AB agreed with the panel 
that the harvesting rights granted by Canadian provincial governments could 
substitute a “provision of goods” in terms of the “financial contribution” element of a 
subsidy (Carmody 2006: 667). The AB then 
 
reversed the Panel‘s interpretation of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement and the 
Panel‘s finding that the US had improperly determined the existence and amount of 
the ―benefit‖ resulting from the financial contribution provided. Then the Appellate 
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Body found that it was unable to complete the legal analysis of whether the US had 
correctly determined benefit in this investigation, due to insufficient factual findings 
by the Panel and insufficient undisputed facts in the Panel record (WTO DS257). 
 
The Panel nevertheless agreed that the DOC had acted inconsistently with both the 
WTO SCM agreement and GATT 1994 by failing to analyze whether subsidies were 
passed through in sales of timber to unrelated producers of softwood lumber 
(Carmody 2006: 667). The AB recommended the U.S. to bring its inconsistent 
measures into compliance with the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994 (International 
Law Update 2004). To comply with the WTO‟s recommendations, the DOC 
performed a pass-through analysis in respect of certain transactions, though the new 
rate of subsidization was calculated to be no different than the old one (Carmody 
2006: 668). The implementation by the U.S. did not please Canada, and considering 
that the measures allegedly taken by the United States to comply with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings were inconsistent with US obligations under relevant 
WTO Agreements, on 30 December 2004 Canada requested the DSB of the 
establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU (WTO DS257). The 
compliance panel found that the U.S. measures were inconsistent with its obligations 
(Carmody 2006: 667). This report was adopted 20 December 2005. This dispute, 
DS257, reflects the complexity of the entire ”WTO-Softwood lumber”-dispute. The 
actions by the countries clearly show the other part that neither is willing to yield. 
According to Pruitt‟s (1991) three strategies towards an agreement, this will 
eventually lead to problem solving.  At the same time, since the Report gave both 
sides partially right, the incentives to continue the dispute were also present. And as 
seen below, Canada had initiated disputes that still were under investigation by the 
WTO. And the United States, using the AB, still had the ability to delay the adoption 
of reports while they were collecting duties on Canadian lumber.  
 
4) DS264 - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada 
 54 
This case started on 13 September 2002 when Canada requested consultations under 
Article 4.8 of the DSU (urgency procedure) with the US concerning the final 
affirmative determination of sales at less than fair value (dumping) with respect to 
softwood lumber products from Canada. Canada considered these measures and, in 
particular, the determinations made and methodologies adopted therein by the DOC 
under authority of the United States Tariff Act of 1930, to violate 15 articles of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles VI and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 (WTO 
DS264).  
 
The panel report was circulated on 13 April 2004 and found that the DOC had acted 
inconsistently with the WTO Antidumping Agreement by calculating antidumping 
margins on the basis of a weighted average comparison employing a “zeroing”5 
methodology (Carmody 2006: 668). All other claims by Canada failed. The U.S. 
appealed this decision, but the AB, on 11 August 2004, upheld the Panel decision. 
The AB also reversed the Panel‟s finding that the United States did not act 
inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its calculation of one of its ITC 
investigations (WTO DS264). This dispute, which was settled before the DS257, was 
a victory for Canada, and the United States stated that they were going to implement, 
within a reasonable period of time, the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a 
manner that respected its WTO obligations (ibid). First, the countries made an 
agreement on a date within “reasonable period of time”, but in May 2005 Canada 
claimed that the United States had not delivered concerning implementation. Canada 
requested the DSB of the establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU 
(implementation). This Panel ruled against Canada‟s claims, Canada made an appeal, 
which on 15 August 2006 reversed the Panel‟s findings and stated that the United 
States acted inconsistently with regards to its WTO obligations (ibid).  This dispute 
was a continuous victory for Canada, and the AB verdict was also the last made by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the six disputes here described. China, the EC, 
India, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand had also participated in a lengthy question round 
                                              
5 This means to potentially depress the average export price and increasing the rate of dumping (Carmody 2006:668).   
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over the calculations made by the United States. The U.S representatives disagreed 
with the interpretations made by these third parties (WTO DS264 Panel Report). 
Nevertheless, the most powerful state in the world was ruled against, and their policy 
was not only deemed inconsistent with WTO obligations, their reputation and 
commitment credibility was now under pressure from other trade partners as well as 
Canada.  
 
5) DS277 - Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood 
Lumber from Canada 
On 20 December 2002, Canada requested consultations with the United States 
regarding the investigation of the USITC in Softwood Lumber from Canada and the 
final definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties applied as a result of the 
USITC‟s final determination made on 2 May 2002, that an industry in the United 
States is threatened with material injury by reason of imports of softwood lumber 
from Canada that the Department of Commerce has determined are subsidized and 
sold in the United States at less than fair value (WTO DS277).  
 
The panel report of this case stated that the that the anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures imposed by the US on imports of softwood lumber from Canada are 
inconsistent with the US obligations under both the Anti-Dumping and the SCM 
agreement, and recommended that those measures be brought into conformity with 
the US obligations (ibid). Considering that the measures allegedly taken by the United 
States to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings were inconsistent with 
US obligations under relevant WTO Agreements, on 14 February 2005 Canada 
requested the DSB of the establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU. The 
Panel found that the determination of the US ITC implementing the Panel and DSB 
recommendations in the original dispute was not inconsistent. Canada then appealed 
to the AB (ibid). On 13 April 2006, The AB reversed the ruling and found the 
implementation and compliance inconsistent. They were however unable to complete 
the analysis and determine whether the USITC's Section 129 determination is 
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consistent or inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the agreements in 
question. As seen, this has happened several times in the “WTO-Softwood lumber”-
dispute. Jackson (2006) explains that this is a common phenomenon in the WTO: 
 
The Appellate Body has found itself in an odd situation occasionally, when it has 
decided that the panel‘s reasoning followed a path that the Appellate Body felt was 
incorrect. Therefore, as an exercise in ―completing the analysis‖, the appellate body 
needed to pay attention to a different legal situation, which however, had not been 
taken up by the first level panel, so that the facts supporting that issue were therefore 
not available. This has led the Appellate Body to decline to take up the question that 
might otherwise have finished the analysis (ibid: 181). 
 
On 9 May 2006, the DSB adopted the AB report and the Panel report, as reversed by 
the AB report (WTO DS277). A sixth case, DS311 - Reviews of Countervailing Duty 
on Softwood Lumber from Canada, which started 14 April 2004, is also part of the 
“WTO-Softwood lumber”-dispute, but this was never taken any further than a 
registered complaint, and a lot of the issues at stake were being treated in other cases. 
After five years and six disputes, the United States‟ CVD practice had been ruled 
illegal according to the WTO agreement. Canada had proven their persistence by not 
yielding and although their policy towards lumber (the stumpage fee) had been said to 
constitute a subsidy, the verdicts in the WTO supported their claim. They also had the 
support of other central states on the international trade arena. Could these facts make 
the United States, the world‟s leading free trade supporter, to change their behavior?    
 
5.2.1. A solution  
On 12 October 2006, the United States and Canada informed the DSB that they had 
reached a mutually agreed solution under Article 3.6 of the DSU in the disputes 
WT/DS236, WT/DS247, WT/DS257, WT/DS264, WT/DS277 and WT/DS311 (WTO 
DS236). This reflects the general desire in the WTO to settle dispute among the 
parties by agreement and in the view of the WTO, makes the case solved. 
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Considering the number of cases, the various rulings by the WTO DSB and by the 
AB, the lack of resources to investigate, and the possibility of a trade war between the 
countries, which are each others‟ largest trade partners, this is not a surprising 
outcome.  A standard assumption in bargaining theory is that in order to be a 
candidate for final agreement, a solution must satisfy two requirements; 1) each party 
must be better off with the agreement than without it, and 2) the settlement must be 
Pareto optimal, a condition which is fulfilled for settlement A if no alternative 
settlement B exists such that at least one party is better of with B than with A, while at 
the same time no party is better of with B than with A (Hovi 1998: 59). In this case, 
Canada needed to strike an agreement to get a potion of the funds collected back and 
to at least lower the duties, and at the same time rid itself of a costly trade dispute. 
The United States got to keep their duties at a satisfactory level, and rid them of a 
trade dispute which ended unfavorably, and ended a behavior that could undermine 
the legitimacy and rules of organizations, The WTO and NAFTA, they helped 
establish and had a national interest in.   
At the same time, since this case holds accusations of subsidization on the Canadian 
account, it becomes easier for the U.S to legitimize its non- compliance, both at the 
international and domestic level. Keeping in mind, that the verdicts from the WTO 
DSB were not “complete” victories for Canada (that the harvesting rights granted by 
Canadian provincial governments could substitute a “provision of goods” in terms of 
the “financial contribution” element of a subsidy), the U.S. held a stronger negotiation 
position.  
The WTO stated that it did not have the resources necessary to complete a full 
investigation into every aspect of the case. This has happened earlier; in the DS44 
Fuji Film case (Jackson 2006: 181). Because of the recourse problem, Jackson claims 
that certain kinds of issues (competition included) seem out of reach of the current 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, and there is a tendency for the DSS to rely very 
heavily on the fact statements of the parties, unless there is a specific refutation 
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(ibid.). A case of this magnitude, and with diverging views on the facts, is not 
surprisingly solved with a settlement.  
5.2.2 The new agreement 
The agreement was signed on 12 September 2006 and made effective one month later. 
It is described by the U.S. Trade Representative in these terms: 
Under the terms of the Agreement, the United States and Canada will end a large 
portion of the litigation over trade in softwood lumber and unrestricted trade will 
occur in favorable market conditions. When the lumber market is soft, Canadian 
exporting provinces can choose either to collect an export tax that ranges from 5 to 
15 percent as prices fall or to collect lower export taxes and limit export volumes. 
The agreement will also include provisions to address potential Canadian import 
surges, provide for effective dispute settlement, distribute the antidumping and 
countervailing (anti-subsidy) duty deposits currently held by the United States, and 
discipline future trade cases. The Agreement will also establish a bi-national working 
group to discuss provincial policy reforms (USTR 2006).  
It was agreed that $4 billion of the $5 billion in penalties collected by the U.S. on 
softwood imports from Canada since 2002 would go back to Canadian producers (AP 
Worldstream 2006). There are various views on the agreement. Daniel Ikenson at the 
libertarian Cato Institute was skeptic and clearly takes a realist perspective: 
 
Calling the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (2006) an ―agreement‖ mocks 
the fact that the Canadians had no viable alternative but to sign on the dotted line. 
One option was to endure the cost and uncertainty of continuous litigation, continued 
restrictions on their lumber exports, and the specter of never again seeing the $5.3 
billion in duties collected illegally by U.S. Customs on previous exports.  The other 
option was for Canadians to agree to impose export restraints (in the form of export 
taxes or quotas) on their lumber and see the return of about 80 percent of that $5.3 
billion (Ikenson 2006).  
 59 
He is backed by Jack Layton, the leader of the Canadian New Democratic Party who 
called the agreement “outrageous, it's a sellout, it's a crime that the Americans would 
keep a billion dollars of money that seven decisions have now said they shouldn't 
have" (Crutsinger 2006). Thus, the agreement made the outcome of the case better for 
the U.S. than strictly following the WTO adjudication. Looking at the free trade 
aspect of the agreement, Gary Hufbauer, an economist at the Institute for International 
Economics, said that "This is all organized to keep competition down and prices high 
for U.S. producers" (ibid.). Jerry Howard, executive vice president of the National 
Association of Home Builders, was also not satisfied and claimed that "for an 
administration that espouses free trade, there is no logical reason to ... engage in one-
sided negotiations that would provide a massive subsidy to the U.S. timber industry at 
the expense of millions of American consumers" (ibid.).  
 
The chairman of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, Steve Swanson called "the 
agreement (…) a compromise on the part of both countries”, and stated that “on 
balance, the agreement is in the interest of U.S. sawmills and their workers." (PR 
Newswire 2006). Keeping in mind that the Coalition is the one that initiated the CVD 
cases, their satisfaction is a clear sign of a favorable outcome on behalf of the U.S.  
As part of the agreement, the Coalition members were to receive $500 million of the 
collected duties during the period from 2001-06. Lawmakers from timber-producing 
U.S. states praised the agreement. The fact that unilateral reduction of tariff barriers is 
beneficial to the country granting it, whether or not other countries reciprocate (Hovi 
1998: 69) can in this case show us that one special interest group in the U.S. got the 
Governments backing at the expense of another. One study on the impact of the 
lumber barriers have shown that as a result, in 2000, the average cost of a new home 
was raised, thus prizing 300.000 American families out of the housing market (Irwin 
2002: 60).  
 
5.3. Comparing the GATT and the WTO disputes 
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Compared to the MOU from 1987, the new agreement of 2006 is quite similar. Chi 
Carmody looks at the case from 2001 to 2006 and finds that both the CVD rates and 
the antidumping rates were lowered, and claims that although “the U.S. and Canada 
might appear to be back where they began - that is, with a politically brokered 
settlement - the litigation probably helped them get there” (Carmody 2006: 674). The 
role of the litigation needs to be questioned. Looking at the negotiation theory and the 
three strategies contending, yielding and problem solving, this case could be seen as a 
display case. Canada started out contending in 1986, then yielding and problem 
solving with the MOU in 1987. Canada was contending again between 1991 and 
1993, and moved towards yielding and problem solving with the SLA in 1996. 
Canada again went back to contending again in 2001 until 2006, and ended up 
yielding and then problem solving in 2006 with the new agreement. And with a new 
agreement which policy resembles both previous agreements, one can claim that the 
U.S. had worn the Canadians out and that the U.S., with its continuous contending 
and appeals in the WTO, used the litigation to show that it had no intention to strictly 
comply with the WTO DSU, nor to completely open up its market. The goal for 
Canada has been free trade, which they did not have and did not get. Instead, after 
several cases in both the WTO and NAFTA, they got a new settlement that still 
demands them to collect an export tax. The litigation did really bring out the 
complexity of this case, but the increased precision, obligation and delegation of the 
WTO could not change the outcome compared to the GATT mechanism.  
5.4 No change in U.S. behavior  
The “GATT-lumber”- dispute and the “WTO-lumber”- dispute are the same dispute 
treated under two different dispute settlement systems. The outcomes of the two are 
however more or less the same. They both ended in a politically brokered agreement. 
Looking at the new quasi-judicial WTO DSB, it seems as it had little or no effect. The 
disputes under the GATT system ended with a negotiated settlement, so did the WTO 
disputes. Although the duties were lowered for Canada, and funds returned, this also 
happened in the 1993 dispute, which later ended in an agreement (The SLA of 1996).  
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Goldstein and Martin (2000) analyses the domestic requisites of free trade and finds 
potential negative effects of legalization. When they considered cooperation with the 
trade regime to be a function of the interests of domestic political actors, they 
question the assumption that increased legalization leads to more trade openness (ibid: 
630). One of the crucial roles for the WTO is to secure reciprocity. By doing this, it 
create an incentive for the export competing businesses to work for trade 
liberalization, and thereby creating a counterweight to the import competing 
businesses (Hovi & Underdal 2000: 72). Increasing precision under the WTO offers 
more information to contending domestic interest groups, and in some stages 
additional information may serve to strengthen protectionists interests, and Goldstein 
and Martin says that legalization may undermine the domestic political balance 
between compliance constituencies and those who contest international commitments 
(Kahler 2000: 675). This case backs that view. Although Canada won the disputes, 
the statement by the WTO that the “stumpage” could be a subsidy gave the Coalition 
for Fair Lumber Imports stronger arguments against free traders in the U.S. This case 
would probably have ended the same way independently of diplomatic or judicial 
dispute settlement, and the number of appeals made it possible to stall the WTO 
Lumber case for several years and for the U.S. to show determination not to yield.  
There are however indications that neither the Canadians nor the Coalition for Fair 
Lumber Imports are ready to quit the dispute. A year after the settlement, in October 
2007, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports sharply criticized recent Canadian 
announcements of yet more taxpayer subsidies for its lumber industry (U.S. Newswire 
2007).  Disputes over the section of the softwood lumber agreement that requires 
Canadian lumber exporters to choose whether to pay export fees of up to 15 percent 
or pay a capped 5 percent fee and export less lumber are still happening, where U.S. 
accuses Canada of manipulating this section to give its lumber producers an unfair 
advantage. The lumber industry estimates that Canada has failed to collect one-third 
of the export taxes it committed to collect under the agreement. This was in December 
2007 (Ravana 2007). It is quite possible that this trade dispute is not yet over.  
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6. The “EC Sugar”-dispute 
The disputes in this chapter concerns two disputes under GATT and three disputes 
under the WTO. The disputes is about EC sugar export subsidies. The disputes are: 
A) Australia and Brazil versus the EEC under the GATT system. The disputes are 
―European communities - refunds on exports on sugar‖ from 1979 and 
―European communities - refunds on exports on sugar complaint by Brazil‖ 
from 1980. The disputes will be referred to as The “GATT-Sugar”-dispute. 
B) Australia, Brazil and Thailand versus the EC under the WTO system. The 
disputes are “European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar (DS265)‖ 
from 2002, ―European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar (DS266)‖ 
from the same year and ―European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(DS283)‖ from 2003. The disputes will be referred to as The “WTO-Sugar”-
dispute.  
In his article, Zangl (2000) suspects that the effect of the legalization “might well be 
limited to disputes among roughly equally powerful actors such as the United States 
and the EU” (ibid: 847). The power relationships between the parts in this dispute 
make it possible to test if this suspicion is valid. It also enables the researcher to see if 
the legalization can have an effect on perhaps the greatest source of disagreement in 
world trade today, namely agricultural policies.  
There are two sources of sugar in the world. Cane is a tropical crop and represented 
60 % of the total world sugar production in 1984. The other is beet, which is a 
temperate crop and represented the remaining 40 % (Mahler 1984: 710). Beet 
production has been subjected to subsidies, protection and minimum price guarantees, 
and it is likely that without this government backing beet would not have been 
produced, since it generally has been more costly than cane to produce, and there have 
been an oversupply of sugar in the world for almost the entire 20
th
 century (ibid: 711, 
719). Beet is what is grown in Europe. Since 1902 there have been several 
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international sugar agreements, but in the years leading up to the “GATT-sugar” 
dispute, Europe did not participate in these agreements. The EEC sugar policy, which 
is a part of the Common Agriculture Program (CAP), resulted in a “rapidly growing 
surplus of high-prized, subsidized Beet sugar that it could dispose of on the world 
market only by means of extensive export subsidies” (ibid: 725). The common 
agricultural policy on sugar, which came into force on 1 July 1968, has two main 
objectives: to ensure that the necessary guarantees in respect of employment and 
standards of living in a stable market are maintained for Community growers of sugar 
beet and sugar cane; and to help guarantee sugar supplies to the entire Community or 
to one of its regions (GATT L/5011: 11). Brazil and Australia, on their hand, relied 
almost entirely on the free market for sugar production. Australia had also had 
preferential trade with Britain under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which had 
ended when Britain joined the EEC in 1973 (Mahler 1984: 721).  
6.1 The “GATT Sugar”- dispute  
The dispute started 25 September 1978 when Australia presented a complaint that was 
circulated to the contracting parties. In the complaint, Australia claimed that the 
refunds on exports of sugar applied by the European Communities were inconsistent 
with the European Communities' obligations under the GATT, and furthermore 
requested the setting up of a panel to examine the problem (GATT L/4833:1). A panel 
was established on 6 November 1978. The EEC did not block the formation of a 
panel. Australia‟s arguments were that EEC sugar export subsidies was not consistent 
with the obligations of member States of the European Communities under the GATT 
and had resulted in Community exporters having more than an equitable share of the 
world export trade in sugar in the terms of GATT Article XVI. It also claimed that the 
policy harmed the Australian interest and that it nullified benefits Australia had of the 
GATT in addition to harming the objectives of GATT (ibid: 2). The GATT 1947 
Article XVI: 1 states that 
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of 
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of 
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any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall 
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the 
subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the 
affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the 
circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is 
determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is 
caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the 
subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties 
concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the 
subsidization (GATT 1947).  
This article is clearly an example of the diplomatic focus of the dispute settlement 
procedure in the GATT. The representative from the EEC argued that the regulations 
concerning sugar had been notified to the GATT pursuant to Article XVI: 1. He also 
claimed that the EEC was inconsistent with GATT only if their practice resulted in 
more than an equitable share of world export trade (GATT L/4833:2). 
The Panel then made a detailed examination of sugar export statistics to see if 
increased Community sugar exports had displaced Australian sugar exports (ibid: 19). 
The increased share of the EEC was according to Mahler an effect of the subsidies 
and the fact that the EEC did not participate in the International Sugar Agreement 
(Mahler 1984: 726). The Panel found that Community sugar exports had directly 
displaced Australian exports only to a limited extent and in a few markets, and 
concluded that it was not in a position to reach a definite conclusion that the increased 
share had resulted in the European Communities "having more than an equitable share 
of world export trade in that product", in terms of Article XVI: 3. It still noted that the 
Community system for granting refunds on sugar exports and its application had 
contributed to depress world sugar prices in recent years and that thereby serious 
prejudice had been caused indirectly to Australia, although it was not feasible to 
quantity the prejudice in exact terms (GATT L/4833: 27). 
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The Panel found that the Community system of export refunds for sugar did not 
comprise any pre-established effective limitations with regards to production, price or 
the amounts of export refunds and constituted a permanent source of uncertainty in 
world sugar markets. It therefore concluded that the Community system and its 
application constitute a threat of prejudice in terms of Article XVI: 1. The Panel 
found itself unable to say what benefits accruing to Australia had been nullified or 
impaired (Ibid). 
In the Panel Report there is no suggestion to the Contracting Parties to recommend 
any action by either party as a solution to the case. This Panel Report was adopted 6 
November 1979.  
The Brazil dispute started 10 November 1978. The argument laid forward by Brazil 
were the same as Australia; EEC exporters had more than an equitable share of 
exports, caused or threaten serious prejudice to Brazil‟s interest and nullified Brazil‟s 
benefits. The panel was established 29 January 1979 and the formation of a panel was 
not blocked by the EEC. The representative of Brazil expressed the opinion that this 
Panel should proceed from the general findings and conclusions arrived at in the 
complaint by Australia (the conclusions that claimed that the EEC did threaten 
prejudice and that the increase in export was a cause of subsidies) (GATT L/5011: 2). 
The EEC pointed out that in the Australia case the Panel concluded that the EEC had 
notified the GATT pursuant to Article XVI: 1, that the EEC did not have more than 
an equitable share of world export trade and that possible impaired benefits on the 
Australian account had not be made out (ibid.: 3).  
The Panel then investigated if the EEC sugar policy had resulted in more than an 
equitable share of the world export trade in terms of Article XVI: 3, had harmed 
Brazilian interests in terms of Article XVI: 1, and that the application of the 
Community system was not in conformity with the guidelines for joint action 
stipulated in Article XXXVIII to further the principles and objectives of Article 
XXXVI (ibid: 16). The Panel then concluded that 
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1) On the basis of the evidence available to it in this particular case, it was not 
able to conclude that the increased share had resulted in the European 
Communities "having more than an equitable share of world export trade in the 
product", in terms of Article XVI: 3 (ibid: 24); 
2) The EEC sugar policy contributed to depress prizes and therefore “constituted 
a serious prejudice to Brazilian interests” and that the EEC system “constituted 
a permanent source of uncertainty in world sugar markets” and thereby a threat 
of serious prejudice (ibid);  
3) For this time-period (1978-9) and for this particular field, the European 
Communities had not collaborated jointly with other contracting parties to 
further the principles and objectives set forth in Article XXXVI, in conformity 
with the guidelines given in Article XXXVIII (ibid.).  
The report was adopted on 10 November 1980. 
6.1.1 Actions taken by the EC 
The conclusions reached in these two cases are quite similar, with the exception that 
in the Brazil dispute that the EEC was also said to not collaborate with the principles 
and objectives in Articles XXXVI and XXXVIII, which concerns the urgency in 
raising the standards of living and the progressive development of less developed 
countries, and the willingness of the Contracting Parties to collaborate jointly for the 
benefit of less - developed countries (GATT 1947: 53-7). Still, it is not possible to say 
that this was a clear cut victory for Australia and Brazil. The panel did not find that 
the EEC policy gave the EEC countries a greater share of the export market, and it did 
not, as it did in the “GATT-alcohol”-dispute, suggest that the Contracting Parties 
should give any recommendations about what actions the EEC should take towards its 
policy. In a similar dispute concerning EEC restrictions on imports on apples from 
Chile adopted on the same day as the Brazil dispute, the Panel reached the conclusion 
that “the Contracting Parties should recommend that the EEC and Chile consult 
bilaterally with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory solution” (GATT L/5047: 
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16). No such suggestion was made in the two sugar disputes. The word “violation” is 
also not mentioned in the conclusions.  
The EEC did revise its CAP sugar regime in 1981. Talk about reform of the Common 
Agriculture Program on a general level had gone on for many years already, and had 
also caused problems within the EEC (Runge & Witke 1990: 255, Marsh 1977). The 
CAP sugar reform dealt with quotas. In 1984, Mahler wrote that “it is still too early to 
tell whether the new provisions will result in a significant decline in Community 
production” (Mahler 1984: 728). The Australian Government did not accept that the 
new sugar regime relieved the EEC of the charge of violating Article XVI, but the 
EEC responded that these accusations were totally unjustified (ibid.). The Economist 
claimed in 2005 that the sugar regime had been untouched since 1968 (Economist 
2005) and is supported by Gibb (2004). Clearly, the outcome of these two disputes 
was that the EEC carried on with their policy virtually unchanged. Hudec (1998, in 
Tangermann 2002: 255), when studying the history of GATT‟s dealing with Article 
XVI: 3(concerning exception for agricultural export subsidies), concludes that 
The structure of Article XVI: 3 exposed it to [several] weakening influences. The 
problem was not just that no one knew what ―equitable share‖ meant. It was that 
every aspect of the rule required tracing the market effects of the subsidy in question. 
Over and over again, panels found a correlation between the timing of a new subsidy 
and a large increase in market share, but time and time again panels were unable to 
convince themselves that the former was the cause of the latter (…) Many 
governments were committed to price support programs that were generating 
surpluses that had to be disposed of, and unless governments could be persuaded, or 
forced, to change those programs they were not going to give up the export subsidies 
that allowed them to solve this problem (ibid.). 
In 1986, the Uruguay round started which 9 years later ended with the creation of the 
WTO. Agriculture, which sugar is a part of, has been one of the most disputed issues 
in the trade negotiations leading up the creation of the WTO and in the trade 
negotiations after the WTO.  From 1947 to 1994, average world tariffs declined from 
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38 % to 4 % (Oatley 2004: 21). The tariff reductions have mainly occurred in 
manufactured goods. In agriculture, protectionism, export subsidies and other non-
tariff barriers have remained and constitutes a significant barrier in the areas where 
developing countries have their comparative advantage (Snoen 2003: 33, Oatley 
2004: 165).  Hudec (1998, in Tangermann 2002: 254) states that the GATT was a 
“conspicuous failure in reducing barriers and other distortions to trade in agricultural 
products” (ibid.) 
Brazil and Australia is part of the Cairns group, which has been particularly critical of 
the agricultural policy of the developed countries. In 1989, the Cairns group members 
told trade officials meeting in Geneva that they would obstruct progress on the 
Uruguay round of tariff-reductions under the GATT “unless Europe and America start 
to talk sense on agriculture” (Economist 1989). The Uruguay round went on for five 
years with several quarrels over agriculture (Economist 1992, 1993). In April 1994 
the round was completed and one year later the WTO was established with a new 
dispute settlement system and a new agreement on agriculture (Tangermann 2002: 
256). In 2000, the EU was the world‟s largest exporter of white sugar with 30 % of 
world exports, while Brazil and Thailand were second and third (Gibb 2004: 569). At 
the same time, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (the farm gate sugar price comprised 
subsidy) in the EU was 43 %, while in Australia it was just 3 % (ibid.). According to 
King, Borell and Hubbard (2000), a liberalization of the EU sugar regime would 
make Australia, Brazil and Thailand the principal beneficiaries (ibid: 23). And in 
2002, the three countries decided to challenge the EU sugar policy in the WTO.  
6.2 The “WTO Sugar”-dispute 
The dispute started On 27 September 2002, when Australia and Brazil requested 
consultations with the European Communities (EC) concerning the export subsidies 
provided by the EC in the framework of its Common Organization of the Market for 
the sugar sector (WTO DS265). Consultations were held in late November 2002, but 
had no result. In March 2003, Thailand requested consultations with the EC on the 
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same issue, consultations were held, but had no result. On 21 July 2003, Australia, 
Brazil and Thailand requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Articles 4.7 
and 6 of the DSU
6
 and Article XXIII: 2 of GATT 1994 and on 29 August 2003 a 
single panel for the three different disputes were established. The three different 
disputes were to be given a report each, at the request of the EC (Panel Report 
WT/DS265/R: 14-5).  
At the core of the dispute were the production quotas of the EC sugar regime. There 
are two categories: A sugar and B sugar. These quotas constitute the maximum 
quantities eligible for domestic price support and direct export subsidies (called 
“refunds” by the EC).  The quota system did not involve any limits on the quantities 
of sugar that may be produced or exported. The sugar in excess of A or B quotas were 
called C sugar, which did not receive support and had to be exported within a certain 
time. If not, a charge would be levied. In the panel report, it was mentioned that “the 
current (2002) EC sugar regime is scheduled for review in 2006” (ibid: 20-22). As a 
result of the EU being a relatively inefficient producer of sugar, and a sugar price 
three times higher than the world prices, export refunds are provided on surplus quota 
sugar exported from the EU. In order to profitably export sugar, EU farmers therefore 
need a substantial export subsidy (European Report 2002, Gibb 2004: 571).  
A central Article in this case is Article 9.1 (a) and (c) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture in GATT 1994. This states that the following export subsidies are subject 
to reduction commitments: 
(a) the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural 
product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a 
marketing board, contingent on export performance; 
(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, 
                                              
6 Here meant to be understood as “The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”.  
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including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the 
exported product is derived;(GATT 1994:50).  
Compared to the GATT 1947 Article XVI: 1, this Article states that the member 
countries are committed to reduction of subsidies, not just to talk about the possibility 
of reducing them.   
6.2.1 Arguments by the parties 
Australia requested the panel to rule that the C sugar produced under the EC sugar 
regime was provided with an export subsidy and that this was a violation of article 9.1 
(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. If the panel did not agree with this, Australia 
wanted the panel to rule that the EC, by applying other export subsidies, violated 
Article 10.1 of the same agreement (Panel Report WT/DS265/R: 22). Australia also 
wanted the panel to find that the EC acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the SCM 
agreement because of a preferential import arrangement with India (ibid: 23). 
Australia requested the panel to recommend that the EC brought its export subsidies 
for sugar into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and 
withdraw the export subsidies inconsistent with the SCM Agreement (ibid). 
Brazil and Thailand had the same requests, but were even clearer in their wording by 
stating that they wanted the panel to recommend “that the EC bring its export 
subsidies for sugar into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement on 
Agriculture by withdrawing without delay the export subsidies for sugar inconsistent 
with the Agreement on Agriculture(Ibid:23).  
The EC requested the Panel to find that, when referring to either Article 9.1 or 10.1, 
exports of C sugar were not in excess of the EC's reduction commitments and that by 
bringing this claim, the Complainants were acting inconsistently with the general 
principle of good faith and Article 3.10 of the DSU. The same applied to the 
suggested violation of the SCM agreement (ibid: 25).  
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6.2.2 Arguments by Third Parties  
This case holds a substantial number of third parties, and several of the third parties 
are also economically powerful countries. The complete list is: 
Australia; Barbados; Belize; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Cuba; Fiji; 
Guyana; India; Jamaica; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; New Zealand; 
Paraguay; St. Kitts and Nevis; Swaziland; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and 
Tobago; United States; Côte d‘Ivoire 
Among the third parties, seven are members of the ―Global Alliance for Sugar Trade 
Reform and Liberalization‖ (GAS) which was formed in 1999 and called for a “WTO 
agreement on agriculture that includes positive, progressive, and meaningful reform 
of the world sugar market by ensuring that sugar is included as an important element 
of the agricultural trade agenda” (GAS 2009). The Alliance represents more than 50 
percent of world sugar production and more than 85 percent of world raw sugar 
exports (ibid).  
Canada noted that despite it being true that sugar production in the European 
Communities was the subject of a complex regulatory regime; this complexity was 
not by itself proof that C sugar benefited from export subsidies. They were also clear 
on that the Article 9.1 had to be read so as to maintain the distinction between 
domestic support and export subsidies (Panel Report WT/DS265/R: 94). The 
complainants in this case had principally based their argument on DS103/113 Canada 
- Dairy (ibid: 31). This dispute was about export subsidies on dairy products from 
Canada which ended in a ruling against Canada. Canada then appealed to the 
Appellate Body, which reversed some of the findings quite similar to the proceedings 
in the “WTO-Softwood lumber”-dispute. The DS103/113 dispute also ended with a 
mutually agreed solution between Canada, the U.S. and New Zealand (WTO DS113). 
The fact that Canada did not give its fellow members of the GAS an outright support 
can perhaps be found in their on interest in maintaining their agricultural policy and 
not contribute to a ruling in a WTO case that could be used against them.  
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 China said that if C sugar were in fact subsidized, that this subsidy should be reduced 
(ibid: 95). India made statements that did not say much about the specific case, but 
rather said that WTO rules should be followed if violated (ibid: 100). The United 
States noted that it took no view as to whether, under the facts of this dispute, the 
measures at issue were consistent with the Agreement on Agriculture and/or the SCM 
Agreement. The relevant question for the United States was whether or not the EC did 
subsidize. If they were, then the EC need to bring its measures into compliance with 
WTO rules (ibid: 108-9). This action by the United States can be seen as a wish to 
increase the legitimacy of the WTO agreement and its rules. The United States here 
also uses the “hard” legalization of the WTO to press the EU to show the credibility 
of their commitment.  That the United States did not take a stand on the consistency 
related to the specific agreements, can maybe come from the fact that they themselves 
has a sugar program designed to protect domestic producers (Irwin 2002:61, 143), and 
did not want to make a clear statement that could be used against them later.  
6.2.3 Conclusions by the panel 
On 15 October 2004, the Panel circulated to Members its separate but identical 
reports of the cases WT/DS283, WT/DS266 and WT/DS265. The Panel concluded 
that the European Communities, through its sugar regime, has acted inconsistently 
with its obligations under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture, by 
providing export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1(a) and (c) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture in excess of its quantity commitment level specified in 
Section II, Part IV of its Schedule, which since the marketing year 2000/2001 is for 
1,273,500 tonnes of sugar and (ii) its budgetary outlay commitment level specified in 
Section II, Part IV of its Schedule
7
, which since the marketing year 2000/2001 is 
€499.1 million per year (Panel Report WT/DS265/R: 178). 
                                              
7 Schedule is documents about agricultural policies, specifying in quantitative detail the commitments (on allowable 
quantities of subsidized exports and outlays on export) the Countries has accepted under the Agreement on Agriculture 
(Tangermann 2002:259, 265).  
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The Panel decided to exercise judicial economy and declined examine the 
Complainant‟ export subsidy claims under Article 3 in the SCM agreement (Panel 
Report WT/DS265/R: 178). The term judicial economy describes the discretionary 
practice of a panel to abstain from making a finding on a claim presented by a 
complaining party, on the grounds that another finding (or findings) of inconsistency 
already sufficiently resolves the dispute at hand (Bohanes & Sennekamp 2006: 424).  
The panel therefore recommended the Dispute Settlement Body to request the EC to 
bring its EC Council Regulation No. 1260/2001, as well as all other measures 
implementing or related to the European Communities' sugar regime, into conformity 
with its obligations in respect of export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture 
(Panel Report WT/DS265/R: 179). The Panel then suggested the EC to bring its 
production of sugar more into line with domestic consumption whilst fully respecting 
its international commitments with respect to imports, including its commitments to 
developing countries (ibid).  
Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said the decision was a big victory for 
Brazil's sugar producers, while a representative for OXFAM, an NGO who have been 
critical of the EC sugar regime for years, said that “this ruling is a triumph for 
developing countries and a death knell for unfair EU sugar export subsidies, which 
undermine poor farmers' livelihoods and deny them the chance to trade their way out 
of poverty” (SEQUERA 2004).  
The EC then appealed the findings 13 January, and on 28 April 2005 the Appellate 
Body Report was circulated. The findings of the Panel Report were upheld, and made 
a clear statement, a opposed to the GATT report, that the EC “violations of the 
Agreement on Agriculture nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the 
Complaining Parties under the Agreement on Agriculture”( WT/DS265/AB/R: 346). 
The Appellate Body did however find that the Panel erred in applying “judicial 
economy” in the SCM part of the case, but found itself not in a position, and declined 
to complete the legal analysis and to examine the Complaining Parties' claims under 
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the SCM Agreement left unaddressed by the panel
8
 (ibid.). 19 May 2005, the DSB 
adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel report, as modified by the Appellate 
Body report. 
6.3 Actions by the EC 
In 2005, the EU exported over 5 million tons of sugar a year and spent around 1.3 
billion Euros a year on export subsidies. The WTO Appellate Body ruled that the EU 
had to limit its subsidized exports of sugar to 1.273 million tons a year and reduce its 
annual expenditure on export subsidies to 499 million Euros a year (European Report 
2005). In a statement to the verdict by the Appellate Body, EU Trade Commissioner 
Peter Mandelson said that “We will abide by our international obligations on the 
sugar regime and will work closely with member states on the necessary reforms 
ahead of the WTO Ministerial in December" (Xinhua News Agency 2005) Both 
Brazilian and Australian representatives were happy with the verdict. Brazil's WTO 
ambassador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa said the ruling, along with an earlier WTO 
ruling against US cotton subsidies initiated by Brazil, represented a "historic decision 
that is certainly going to help the inclusion of agriculture in the multilateral trading 
rules system" (Agra Europe 2005).  He is supported by Jackson, who claims that these 
disputes “will undoubtedly have implications for the new Doha round of trade 
negotiations and for the agriculture subsidy practices of the United States, EU, Japan 
and Canada” (Jackson 2006: 163).  
At the DSB meeting on 13 June 2005, the European Communities informed the DSB 
of its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and stated 
that it would require a reasonable period of time to implement them (WTO DS265). 
The complaining parties were however not satisfied. Australia's WTO ambassador 
Spencer had already 29 April 2005 said that EU compliance with the WTO ruling 
would not require any legislative changes and that there was "no reason why they 
                                              
8 Here we again see that the Appellate Body was not able, as in the “WTO-Softwood lumber”-dispute DS277, to complete 
the full analysis of the facts of the dispute.  
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can't do it (comply with the ruling) straight away" (Agra Europe 2005b). 9 August 
2005, the complaining parties to the dispute informed the DSB that as the parties had 
been unable to reach agreement on a reasonable period of time for implementation in 
accordance with DSU Article 21.3(b), and that they would like to request that the 
reasonable period of time be determined through binding arbitration (WTO DS265). 
This was done, and 28 October 2005 the arbitrator determined the reasonable period 
of time to 12 months and 3 days, expiring on 22 May 2006 (ibid).  
In September 2005, EU decided to declassify its sugar quotas, which resulted in 
almost 1.9 million tons of sugar and other sweeteners produced under the EU's A and 
B domestic production quotas to be declassified as C sugar, which can be sold on the 
international market at global prices. Australia, Brazil and Thailand argued that this 
would result in approximately 7.2 million tons of subsidized EU sugar exports in 
2005, almost 6 million tons above the EU's allowed limit (Agra Europe 2005c). The 
three countries would however not pursue this as a new dispute under the WTO, but 
asked for the decision to be discussed at a WTO meeting in October 2005. They 
strongly cautioned the EU against taking measures such as sugar declassification 
which would serve to undermine both the EU's WTO obligations and the effective 
functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body (ibid.). An EU spokesman said the 
decision to de-classify the excess sugar was perfectly legal under WTO rules, since 
the trade body had yet to tell the EU from what point it had to come into compliance 
with the sugar panel's verdict (ibid).  
On 8 June 2006, Australia, Brazil and Thailand informed the DSB that they each had 
reached an Understanding under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU with the European 
Communities. This agreement states that the EC feels that they have complied and 
that the complaining parties are not satisfied with the compliance within a reasonable 
period of time. The agreement therefore states, inter alia, that 1)the complaining 
countries are entitled at any time to request the establishment of a panel pursuant to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU; 2) the European Communities shall accept the establishment 
of that panel 3) that time limits are to be followed; 4) the complaining parties shall not 
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request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations under Article 22 of 
the DSU until the adoption by the DSB of the Article 21.5 panel report and, where 
relevant, the Appellate Body report; and 5) The parties to this dispute will continue to 
cooperate in all matters related to this Understanding and not to raise any procedural 
objection to any of the steps set out (WT/DS265/36). The agreement can be said to be 
an agreement between the countries on “how to continue to disagree.” One of the 
reasons for the disagreement was that Australia, Brazil and Thailand not only objected 
to the fact that C sugar export licenses would remain valid for use until the end of 
August, but also the fact that EU sugar exports in 2005/06 would increase with 
several tons (Agra Europe 2006).  
Three weeks later, reform of the EU sugar regime was in place. This reform had been 
debated for some time, and as mentioned in the WTO Panel Report, a reform was 
already scheduled in 2002. In 2004, ten member countries, including among others 
Italy, Spain, Greece and Finland, warned of the “devastating effect" of the reform, 
while NGOs like OXFAM and WWF released papers supporting the reform 
(European Report 2004). In 2006, a consensus emerged. The result was that the EU 
institutional price for white sugar would be cut by 36% over four years from 2006 
with a cumulative reduction over four years of 20%, 27.5%, 35% and 36%. The 
minimum price for beet would be decreased by 39.5% over the same period. All beet 
growers would receive an average of 64.2% for losses in earning because of the price 
cut. The A and B quotas would be merged into a single production quota. Validity of 
the new regime, including extension of the sugar quota system, was set to be until 
2014/15. From 2009, the 49 poorest countries in the world were to have complete 
access to EUs market (Agra Europe 2005b, EU 2006). The European Commission, 
declared in a statement that the reform would "ensure a long-term sustainable future 
for sugar production in the EU, enhance the competitiveness and market-orientation 
of the sector and strengthen the EU's position in the current round of world trade 
talks" (Xinhua News Agency 2006).  
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In 2008, the Economist could tell us that “next year the EU should become a net 
importer of sugar for the first time” (Economist 2008). And there has not been a new 
dispute in the WTO between the countries involved in the WTO sugar case. This 
could signal that the countries in the dispute have been satisfied since its conclusion. 
At the same time, the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which was launched in 2001, 
has been stalled due to disagreements over farm subsidies and import tariffs (Xinhua 
News Agency 2008). This round has yet to be concluded, and the fact that multilateral 
trade talks are being held, could explain why a new case has not emerged. The 
verdicts in agricultural trade disputes in the WTO that Jackson (2006) and Steinberg 
(2005) believed would help favor agricultural subsidy reductions, have therefore not 
been proven to have such effect.  
6.4 Comparing the GATT and the WTO disputes 
The GATT disputes ended in virtually nothing, whereas the WTO disputes ended with 
a reform of the EU sugar regime. Where the panel reports from the GATT period did 
not have a clear statement about a violation and did not recommend anything, the 
panel reports from the WTO disputes made it very clear that the EC had violated the 
WTO rules and both the Panel and the Appellate Body recommended the EU to bring 
its policy into conformity with its obligations. The EU said it was willing to comply, 
but then the “WTO-Sugar”-dispute ended with an agreement between the parts that 
makes it clear that the complaining parties were not satisfied with the respondent‟s 
compliance. This is in contrast to the “Japan-Alcohol”-dispute, where the 
complainants were satisfied. At the same time, a change in the EU sugar policy is 
clearly visible and they are now on their way to becoming a net importer of sugar. 
What can explain this change and did the legalization play a part in it? 
In 2002, before the WTO disputes started, the EU sugar reform was already in the 
making. This was a reform of a system that was expensive, left sugar in excess on the 
world market, was in direct opposition to the economic rationality of free trade and 
received harsh criticism from NGOs working with third world development (Norberg 
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2003, Gibb 2004). In order to get the will to reform the system, the EU needed to go 
through internal political processes. According to Gibbons (1992), there have been 
especially three sources of pressure on the EU CAP system, which the sugar regime 
was a part of. These are 1) International pressure channeled through the Uruguay 
Round and GATT, 2) an internal momentum which has come from within the EU for 
financial reform, especially during the 1980s/early 1990s, and 3) the impact of issues 
from the wider EU agenda on the CAP, especially the Single European Market, 
changing consumer habits, enlargement of the EU and the environment (ibid.: 286). 
As the EU has evolved, its policies have undergone change and an internal debate. A 
growing world consensus towards the importance of free trade, a consensus the EU 
has had a part in creating, has continuously increased the external pressure for reform.   
As a curiosity, Peterson and Bomberg (1999) claims that external pressure to reform 
the CAP sometimes actually has stiffened European resolve to defend the existing 
CAP (ibid.: 121). Nevertheless, in 1999, a reform of the CAP was made based on the 
need to adapt to the EU‟s WTO commitments, current and future, and the need to 
prepare for Eastern enlargement (Tangermann 2002: 276). The reasons given by the 
EU for the sugar regime reform was first and foremost to strengthen the EU market 
position.  
This also makes the time aspect relevant. The EU sugar regime had been unchanged 
since 1968. The actions taken by the EU can therefore be seen as a natural reform 
based on the need to adapt to a changing international environment. Their sugar 
policy had been criticized since the late 1970s, it had been challenged under two 
GATT disputes and it was also a part of the heated argument over agriculture under 
the Uruguay Round. A change is therefore not surprising, and if anything, the WTO 
verdict can have made it easier for the supporters of the reform to prove its necessity. 
The EU can also use the WTO verdict to give them both a better international 
reputation and better credibility, by claiming that the reform show that they are 
willing to change according to the demands of the WTO. This supports both the 
neoliberal notion that legalization can be used to press domestic actors to change, and 
the realist notion that state representatives only use the language of international law 
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as a rhetorical device to justify their behaviour, which is in actual fact only motivated 
by the desire to serve their national interest.  
When discussing the possibility of using international organizations as “tools” for 
change in agricultural policy, Hudec (1998, in Tangermann 2002: 254-55) states that 
“If governments lack the political will to obey the rules, the rules will not work, no 
matter how well they are crafted” (ibid.) He then further claims that  
In agriculture, there was‖a lack of political will on the part of the relevant 
governments. However much they may have declared their desire to liberalize 
agricultural trade, the large developed countries of North America and Europe that 
yielded ultimate power in GATT did not really want to liberalize agricultural trade. 
Each of these governments was committed to a program for supporting farm 
income.‖ (ibid.).  
Hudec then concludes on the new Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that  
although the (…) rules of the AoA are likely to have few if any immediate liberalizing 
effects, it can be said that the basic design does set the WTO in the right direction 
(…) the Export subsidy commitments in the AoA do avoid the major weaknesses of 
their antecedent GATT provisions (ibid.).  
These facts are important when analyzing the actions taken by the EU. The WTO 
DSS together with the new AoA made the “WTO-Sugar”-dispute end with a clear 
ruling based on the new agreement, as opposed to the “GATT-Sugar”-dispute, where 
the result were an unclear ruling due to an unclear law. This is in line with the 
neoliberal principles for “hard” legalization outlined in chapter 3. But if legalization 
played a part in changing the EU policy, it was due to the increased precision of the 
individual commitments accepted by the countries in the AoA. The legalized dispute 
settlement procedures played a minor role, and can in fact be said to have given the 
EU, due to the possibility of appealing, “room to breathe” and at the same time 
provide an opportunity to continue with it exports subsidy while finishing the political 
bargaining for a sugar reform.  The WTO dispute took three years more to complete 
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than the GATT dispute, and the EU is still subsidizing sugar. The WTO verdict thus 
provides legitimacy to the export subsidy provisions of the AoA, an instrument that 
Tangermann (2002) points out is “a trade policy instrument that should not, according 
to GATT principles, exist at all” (ibid.: 265).  The increased legalization, although it 
did not provide a substantial change the EU sugar policy, did at least provide a clear 
verdict as opposed to the GATT dispute. This can have an effect at the completion of 
the Doha Round, but this remains to be seen.  
The vague “equitable share” in the GATT has been replaced by “the precise 
quantitative limits by country and product group, with corresponding notification 
requirements and the transparency they create in the WTO committee on Agriculture” 
(Tangermann 2002: 265).  The verdict can therefore be said to be not as much a result 
of the procedure as it is a result of the new agreement. Tangermann (2002) claims that 
“it is probably not wrong to say that the reduction commitments on „old‟ export 
subsidies” in the AoA are targeted at the EU, since EU holds a share of more than 85 
% of all the worldwide export subsidy expenditure (ibid: 266). And even though the 
AoA is targeted at the EU, the EU did, in the period 1995 to 1998, grant less than 50 
% of the export subsidies it could have spent in accordance with its commitments 
(ibid:275). The WTO verdict together with the AoA thereby provides legitimacy to 
the export subsidy provisions of the AoA, an instrument that is “a trade policy 
instrument that should not, according to GATT principles, exist at all” (ibid.: 265). 
These facts also supports the views held by the enforcement school, which claims that 
countries will enter into agreements that require little change in policy.  
The change in behavior on the EU part in this case is in my opinion more a result of 
the time aspect mentioned above. The legalization made the EU follow the 
proceedings, but they also did this under GATT. And when the WTO verdict provided 
a clear statement, the only result of this was cosmetic changes in the sugar regime. 
The real change, the sugar reform, comes from other sources than the legalization.   
Zangl (2008) investigates two disputes where agricultural products are the issue, “the 
citrus/bananas case”, where the EU was the respondent and the United States was the 
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complainant. Where the GATT citrus case took ten years and ended with an 
agreement, the WTO bananas case took four years, ended with a verdict against the 
EU, and then took another two years for the parts to conclude on a WTO compliant 
regime on bananas (ibid.: 844) Zangl then claims that “one can maintain that it (the 
EU) is more compliant under the judicialized WTO procedure than it had been under 
the diplomatic GATT mechanisms” (ibid.). In “the citrus/bananas case” the opponent 
was the United States, the most powerful nation in the world.  In the “WTO-sugar”-
dispute, which also centers on agricultural policies, the opponents were smaller 
countries, and this changed the power distribution in favor of the EU. I would say that 
it if these procedures had an effect, it was relatively small compared to the effect of 
the new Agreement on Agriculture, internal discussion, the need to reform an old 
sugar regime and to adapt itself to the rules of a new organization. As opposed to 
what Zangl (ibid.) found in his article, in the “EC-Sugar”-dispute, the EU is not more 
compliant with the WTO procedure than with the GATT mechanisms. It does 
however support the statement made by Zangl that the effect of the legalization 
“might well be limited to disputes among roughly equally powerful actors such as the 
United States and the EU” (ibid: 847).  
When faced with a powerful opponent under the GATT regime, namely the United 
States, the EU decided to block the formation of a panel for a year and then the 
adoption of the panel report (ibid:842). In the “GATT-sugar”-dispute, faced with 
weaker opponents, they did not block any part of the process. When they were ruled 
against, they did not change their policy. Clearly, a dispute against a weaker opponent 
under the GATT was not something that concerned the EU and could provide a 
reason to why the EU behaved differently in the sugar dispute than in the 
“citrus/bananas dispute”.  
The EU was one of the parts that pressed for legalization during the Uruguay Round, 
and by using the Appellate Body in this case, they could postpone a verdict while 
keeping their export subsidies intact. In the area of agriculture, free trade has a long 
way to go, and by creating this legitimacy of export subsidy, an instrument EU is the 
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biggest user of and where it also has the opportunity to use it on a larger scale, the 
verdict against the EU can actually serve its interest and give increased legitimacy to a 
reform they already had planned.     
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7.0 Main findings and discussion 
Compliance is “a state of conformity or identity between an actor‟s behavior and a 
specified rule”. Closely linked to this is implementation, the process of putting 
international commitments into practice. In this chapter I will discuss the effect the 
WTO DSS had on compliance in the three pairs of cases I have investigated. I will do 
this in light of the theories outlined in chapter three. 
7.1 The “Japan Alcohol”-dispute 
The “Japan Alcohol”-dispute pair is the clearest case of an increased effect on 
compliance due to legalization. The case was tried under both the GATT DSS and the 
WTO DSS, and where the GATT made Japan change their policies somewhat, the 
WTO made them comply to full, and with the satisfaction of the complainants. 
However, both the realist explanation and the enforcement school explanation have to 
be considered in this case pair. 
In the GATT dispute, Japan was faced with the European Communities. The United 
States and Canada did support the EC, but did not make it into a case of their own. In 
the dispute under the WTO, Japan faced actual complaints from all three countries, 
which together with Japan have the highest share of world trade. The distribution of 
power was now more in favor of the complainants, thereby increasing the pressure on 
Japan. The outcome of this dispute can therefore plausibly be linked to the realist 
explanation. 
This dispute does also contain support for the views held by the enforcement school. 
There are several indications pointing to the fact that Japan must have expected that 
their alcohol policy were going to be disputed under the new WTO DSS: Japan had 
actively contributed in the Uruguay Round leading to the creation of the WTO. They 
had also supported the establishment of a legalized dispute settlement system. In 
addition, prior to the creation of the WTO, Japan participated in trade talks were their 
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alcohol politics were being heavily debated and criticized by the later complaining 
parties in the WTO case. These facts could suggest that Japan entered the WTO 
knowing that their alcohol policy was going to be tested under a trade regime with 
clearer rules and time limits and with stricter implementation demands, thereby 
increasing the international pressure for alcohol tax reform. This could suggest 
support for the enforcement claim that countries enter agreements with an already 
established knowledge of what the cost will be. But understand why then Japan spent 
time on debating their alcohol policy during the Uruguay Round and at the same time 
pressed for legalization, it is necessary to look at the domestic level.  
The institutionalist claim that legalization can increase the ability to commit domestic 
actors with diverging views to an international commitment is highlighted with this 
dispute pair. Several studies have shown that the voting system in Japan has favored 
the representation of producer groups who feel threatened by trade, thereby 
exacerbating Japan‟s conflict with the United States (Gourevitch 2002: 312).  
Pekkanen (2001) claims that after winning disputes under the GATT, the Japanese 
attitude towards international trade rules changed in the late 1980‟s (ibid: 58). 
Bureaucrats in the Japanese state saw this as an opportunity “to counteract 
protectionist interest in politically powerful sectors” (ibid: 41). In the alcohol dispute 
under the WTO, bureaucrats from the Japanese Ministry of Finance “were able to play 
on the importance of upholding Japan‟s legal obligations in a multilateral setting and, 
even more importantly, of the material risks that could be inflicted under the WTO 
rules” (ibid: 66). Also, for a country of Japan‟s power and size, being compliant with 
an international ruling, can be in their interest. Their compliance can contribute to 
increase the legitimacy and credibility of the WTO and the legalized system, which 
for Japan can be useful when they are the complainant, especially in disputes against 
more powerful parties as the U.S and the EU.  
In my opinion, the “Japan Alcohol”-dispute is an example of all the mechanisms 
outlined by the Neoliberal Institutionalists working together to secure compliance 
with the rulings of an international organization. The legalization increased the 
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pressure for alcohol tax reform in Japan both on the international and domestic level. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, NLI does not ignore the effect of state power on other 
states, which is present in this case. But this still doesn‟t make the design of an 
organization irrelevant, as this case show.  
7.2 The “EU Sugar”-dispute 
The “EU Sugar” dispute pair is a more complex matter than the “Japan Alcohol”-case 
pair. The WTO dispute lead to a change in the EU policy concerning sugar after a 
dispute where the complainants Australia, Brazil and Thailand were up against a more 
powerful adversary. The EU seems to have been more compliant with the rules and 
rulings in the WTO dispute than in the GATT dispute. What were the mechanisms 
leading to this, and when looking at implementation and actual change in the EU 
sugar policy, did the EU really comply?  
One of the arguments for legalization set forward by institutionalists, is that 
legalization entails a specific form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion 
in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts, which largely disqualifies arguments 
based solely on interests and preferences. Compared to the old GATT agreement the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is a lot clearer on rules concerning agriculture 
and these rules are also expressed in numerical commitments (Tangermann 2002: 
257). The EU did not block any part of the process in the GATT dispute, but then 
again, the GATT rules for agriculture were not clear and made a ruling in the GATT 
dispute virtually toothless. When a similar dispute appeared before the WTO system, 
considerations based on numbers and facts were much easier to make, and the case 
ended in a clear recommendation by the Dispute Settlement Body. The increased 
precision WTO as a whole thus increased the possibility of this dispute reaching a 
solution, and a solution that was based on factual aspect 
However, the views held by the enforcement school are also highly relevant in this 
case. Before the WTO case started in 2002, the EU was planning a reform of its sugar 
regime, which had been more or less unchanged since 1968. And since the creation of 
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the WTO in 1995 the EU had been exceeding its annual commitment levels 
concerning sugar exports (WTO DS265). The reasons given for the reform was based 
on securing the competiveness of EU sugar production for the future. Thus, by 
entering an organization (the WTO) and then later complying with WTO rulings, the 
EU achieved a practically “cost free” increase in the credibility of their commitments. 
And by stalling both the adoption of the panel report by appealing to the Appellate 
Body and then the implementation, the legalization of the WTO gave them a period of 
“cost free” non-compliance as mentioned by Horlick (2002).  The term “cost-free” 
could even be seen as an understatement due to the fact of the possible gains the EU 
had by being able to keep their policy for a longer period of time. The entire 
negotiation period of the new sugar reform was by this being held with their policies 
intact. This dispute do however suggest that a state‟s (or union of states as the EU) 
preferences can be changed due to participation in an international agreement. The 
CAP reforms, including the sugar reform, made by the EU have all come about 
partially due to participation in both trade talks such as the Uruguay Round and trade 
organizations such as the GATT/WTO. But if the increased legalization made this 
happen, is not strongly supported. The long diplomatic Uruguay Round made a 
clearer contribution.  
At the same time, the legalization of the WTO could have contributed to 
strengthening the arguments for those countries pressing for reform in the internal EU 
discussion. This is in line with the NLI hypothesis of legalization being able to 
commit domestic actors, in this case other countries in the internal EU discussion, 
with diverging views to an international commitment. Looking upon the history of 
supporters and opponents of agricultural trade liberalization in the EU, Britain has 
been the strongest supporter and France the strongest opponent. Already in 2000, The 
UK agricultural minister welcomed the prospect of reform of the EU sugar regime 
(M2 Presswire 2000). One of the reasons for the length of the Uruguay Round was 
EU, and particularly French, opposition to agriculture reform (Economist 1993, Ostry 
2002: 285). But the potential gains from service sector liberalization led France and 
other European states to agree on a negotiation agenda that included trade (Davis 
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2004: 156). The result of the Uruguay Round was as we now know a new trade 
agreement with legalized rules. That the new legalized system and the loss in the 
dispute can have had an effect on making the new sugar reform happen, because of 
the increased ability to press domestic actors provided by the legalization.  
However, on the international level the “EC Sugar” dispute it is hard to see that the 
EU has complied. Compared to the “Japan Alcohol”-dispute, which ended with the 
satisfaction of the complainants, the “EC Sugar”-dispute ended with an agreement 
where the complainants were not satisfied. That the complainants were not satisfied is 
however not enough to establish clear non-compliance on the EU part. In the “EC 
Sugar”-dispute, the complainants would have had substantial benefits if the world 
sugar market would be completely liberalized. To claim dissatisfaction is in the 
complainants interest and could be used by the complainants at the Doha Round. So 
an agreement that states that the EC feels that they have complied and that the 
complaining parties are not satisfied with the compliance within a reasonable period 
of time is about the same outcome as under the GATT: A diplomatic stand off. The 
precise sugar quotas in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture were violated by the EU 
for over ten years. Compared to the GATT rules on agriculture, a violation of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture is easier to see. But to prevent it and stop it, is still 
hard.  
7.3 The “US lumber”-dispute 
Zangl claims that “the EU is the only contender with whom the United States had 
disputes that allowed pair wise comparisons of similar cases”(ibid: 832). The “US 
lumber”-dispute pair shows that this is wrong. It also contradicts the claims made by 
Zangl, because it ended in the same way under both the GATT and the WTO. Upon 
the creation of the WTO, the signing countries “saw increased legalization of the 
judicial process as a means of constraining U.S. unilateralism (that is, action pursuant 
to section 301) by effectively forcing the United States to seek decisions from the 
DSB before imposing sanctions for alleged noncompliance with WTO 
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obligations”(Steinberg 2004: 250). This dispute show that this was not achieved, and 
the United States did not change their behavior, at least not in this dispute pair.  
The case leads to the problem pointed out by Kim (2008):  
Legalization (…) imposes costs on countries by increasing the complexity and 
difficulty of procedures for them to utilize. Countries with the bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity to follow the elaborate procedures reap the benefits of 
increased legalization (…) legalization of international institutions does not level the 
power-based playing field of international politics (ibid: 658)  
Kim‟s study concludes that developed countries are more likely to utilize dispute 
settlement. The “US lumber”-dispute pair shows that although Canada was willing to 
take the dispute to the WTO six times, the economic cost of keeping the trade dispute 
going and the persistence of the United States to not yield, in a legalized system with 
disputes between developed countries, the power based playing field is still not 
leveled. Also, the “irresistible temptation” to delay compliance described by Horlick 
(2002) is highly relevant in this dispute. Under the GATT, although the opportunity 
for member countries to block each step of the process was possible, the opportunity 
to delay compliance “legally” through the Appellate Body was not available. Under 
the GATT, after bilateral consultations, the lumber dispute in 1987 ended quickly in a 
brokered settlement. The second “GATT Lumber”-dispute from 1991 to 1993 took 
one year more, but ended with another agreement. 
 With the WTO, the United States could delay both compliance and signing a possible 
deal because of the legalized system. At the same time, they could continue to collect 
funds from the countervailing duties imposed on Canada, thereby continuously 
increasing the sum of money to be used as a tool for getting Canada to the negotiation 
table. So the end result was that the legalized dispute settlement system, established 
very much as an interest of the most powerful nation in the world helped the same 
nation, by being able to prolong the dispute period, to increase leverage in a future 
negotiation. This is in keeping with the realist view that the institutions of the world 
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mirror the interests of powerful states. Also, it is in keeping with the realist notion 
that states seek to increase their power in the international anarchy. 
From a strictly economic point of view, an importing country can benefit from 
receiving subsidized goods. Even when a subsidy harms domestic producers, it allows 
the importing country to purchase imports at a lower prize, “thanks to the generosity 
of foreign taxpayers” (Irwin 2002: 112). But subsidies also generate political friction 
among trading partners, each viewing the other‟s government as putting a finger on 
the scales of international competition to tip the outcome toward its own favored 
producers (ibid). The relative gains view held by realists could be used as an 
explanation for the anti-free trade stance taken by the United States in this dispute, 
even when it was faced with goods subsidized with another country‟s money. This 
dispute ended in cooperation via an agreement, but from an economic point of view, 
the agreement is the best outcome for neither the United States nor Canada. This 
dispute pair is in keeping with realists claiming that states often fail to cooperate even 
in the face of common interest. 
The CVD used by the United States in this case is based on Section 301
9
 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. Section 301 deals with two practices: (1) violations of U.S. rights under 
a trade agreement, and (2) otherwise unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory 
actions or policies that burden or restrict U.S. commerce (Finger 1991: 132). This is a 
unilateral approach to addressing trade disputes, and was not viewed favorably by the 
rest of the world. When negotiating the new WTO dispute settlement procedures, the 
United States, “aligned closely with Canada” (Barton et al 2006: 70) proposed both 
the automatic adoption of panel reports and the right to appeal to a new Appellate 
Body. The time limits would be modeled after the time limits in the Section 301. The 
U.S. view was that if WTO rules were in consistence with the timelines in Section 
301, a more legalized WTO dispute settlement system would legitimize U.S. use of its 
market power to pressure other countries to comply with U.S trade policy objectives 
                                              
9 Although it says section 304 in the panel report, to say section 301 is correct. The entire section consists of section 301-
310. See WTO DS152, report of the panel. 
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(ibid: 71). The result was that the Dispute settlement Understanding works in almost 
complete sync with section 301 to create political incentives for foreign governments 
to comply with their WTO obligations and to restrain U.S unilateralism when foreign 
governments are complying. Therefore, “from the U.S. government perspective, the 
radical judicial reforms of the Uruguay round represented (…) an Americanization of 
the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process (ibid:74).  
The problem with the Section 301 is that it unchains the U.S. export interests from the 
necessity to oppose U.S. import competing interests. It arms the U.S negotiator not 
with the authority to remove U.S import restrictions, but with the threat to impose 
new ones and thus providing the domestic political mechanisms to press for export 
expansion without paying the price of removing U.S. import restrictions (Finger 1991: 
132).  
The politics of the Section 301 was challenged by the EU in the WTO dispute DS152 
from 1998, but the Section 301 was found not to be inconsistent with the WTO rules. 
Canada supported the EU view as a third party (WT/DS152/R: 236). The United 
States has with the establishment of the WTO both managed to give its domestic 
policy increased international legitimacy and increased their possibility for power use. 
The “US lumber”-dispute supports a realist world view from start to finish, and 
contrary to what Zangl found in his article, I found that the United States did not 
change their behaviour due to legalized dispute settlement.  
In all three dispute pairs in this thesis, the possibility to block a part of the GATT 
process has not been used extensively. The only time was at the beginning of the 
“GATT Alcohol”-dispute. The countries in question were all willing to follow the 
GATT procedures when a complaint was made. However, all the WTO disputes in 
this thesis have been appealed to the appellate body which, in the cases where the EU 
and the United States were the respondent, proved to serve the interest of the more 
powerful part in the dispute. This was also the parties that pressed for the legalization 
of the WTO. To block a part of a process in an international organization can decrease 
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both the credibility of a country‟s commitment to an agreement and its reputation as a 
cooperative country.  
As opposed to this, to appeal a verdict under a legalized regime is easier to defend 
and at the same time shows that a country is willing to follow the procedures of an 
international organization. Appealing is thus a more legitimate way of postponing a 
decision while keeping your policies intact. For a rational self interested actor, this 
opportunity is something it won‟t miss. More rules, more procedures and more 
numbers also make an appeal more likely; there is more to disagree upon. And when 
the judges you face don‟t have the resources to investigate all the aspects of a dispute, 
non-compliance can be defended.  
In the dispute pairs I have investigated, the GATT disputes lasted shorter than the 
WTO disputes. With the exception of the “JAPAN-Alcohol”- case, the outcomes in 
the WTO disputes were more or less the same as under the GATT: Although a 
violation was proven, full compliance were not chosen and a deal were made. And the 
more powerful the actor was, the more did the legalized procedures serve its interest. 
Interestingly, these were the same actors who wanted it.    
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8.0 Conclusion 
8.1 Summary 
In this thesis I have investigated the effect the new legalized dispute settlement 
system introduced by the WTO in 1995 has had on compliance. A major objective has 
been to check the robustness of findings reported by Zangl (2008). Zangl claims to 
have found a change in countries behavior due to increased legalization. I have tested 
whether his findings extend to a different set of cases. 
In chapter 2 I explained how the GATT DSS worked, and described how the WTO 
brought about a more legalized DSS compared to the GATT. 
In chapter 3 I used two different theoretical schools within political science, realism 
and neoliberal institutionalism, to develop a set of hypotheses about the expected 
effects the change from a more diplomatic system to a more legalized system might 
have. While realists expect such a change to have little or no impact on a nation‟s 
behaviour, neoliberal institutionalists claim that the design of an institution will often 
impact on cooperation and compliance.   
In chapter 4, 5, and 6 I analysed three pairs of similar disputes, each pair consisting of  
one dispute that was tried under the GATT DSS and one that were tried under the 
WTO DSS. The pairs I chose included (1) two disputes over alcohol taxes between 
Japan on the one hand and the EU, Canada and the United States on the other, (2) two 
disputes over lumber tariffs between the United States and Canada, (3) two disputes 
over sugar subsidies between the EU on the one hand and Australia, Brazil and 
Thailand on the other.   
Finally, in chapter 7 I discussed the findings in light of the theories outlined in chapter 
3.  
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8.2 Main conclusions 
The most important conclusions entailed by the analysis in the preceding chapters 
may be summarized in six points  
First, the dispute pairs I have analysed shows that power and state sovereignty remain 
significant factors in trade negotiations. The claim set forward by Hudec (1998, in 
Tangermann 2002: 254) that “if governments lack the political will to obey the rules, 
the rules will not work, no matter how well they are crafted”(ibid.) is still valid. The 
“US-softwood lumber”-clearly illustrate this. However, the “EU-sugar” dispute point 
in the same direction 
Second, my analysis supports the institutional notion that international organisations 
can impact on countries behaviour, and that clearer rules and regulations, can make 
countries more willing to cooperate. Although power still plays a significant part in 
negotiations between countries, in both the “Japan-Alcohol”-dispute pair and in the 
“EU-sugar”-dispute pair, the new WTO rules seem to have enhanced cooperation  
Third, my analysis suggests that when studying the effect international organisations 
have on compliance, the intentions towards a future trade policy held by the countries 
prior to a dispute is of importance. In both the “Japan-Alcohol”-case pair and the 
“EU-sugar”-case pair, pre-existing intentions of policy change played an important 
role in fostering cooperation and reform. This is in keeping with the enforcement 
school‟s claim that compliance can come from an already planned intention of 
change. 
Fourth, legalization can be used as a tool for convincing domestic actors that policy 
change is required. This is in keeping with the neoliberal school. The “Japan-
Alcohol”-dispute pair is the strongest example of this effect, but the “EU-Sugar”-
dispute pair reveals a similar tendency.  
Fifth, and paradoxically, legalization can further increase the power of an already 
powerful country, as shown in the “US-Softwood lumber”-dispute pair. The 
 94 
possibility to appeal a Panel Report to the Appellate Body represents an opportunity 
for countries to delay the adoption of a report. In the “US-Softwood lumber”-dispute 
pair, the fact that the United States could collect duties during the entire period of the 
dispute, which were lengthened by the appeal process, made their negotiation power 
even stronger than it would have been otherwise. Also, the “EU-Sugar”- dispute pair 
revealed that the appeal function might serve to lengthen a period with a trade policy 
not in conformity with WTO rules. 
Finally, the US-Softwood lumber-dispute pair showed that the hope that legalization 
would prevent U.S. unilateralism was unwarranted (at least in this case). The United 
States is still willing to use the Trade Act of 1974 when its interests are threatened. 
This suggests that Zangl‟s (2008) conclusions about a change in the trade related U.S. 
behaviour due to legalization must be modified.  
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